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There is no getting around it: valuing young startups is unavoidably difficult.1
Unicorns2 and other high-flying startups get the press, but every startup must first launch 
and grow. The US startup market cannot flourish unless young startups survive and 
develop into highly successful companies. Most young startups need outside capital to get 
through their early stages (commonly referred to as “seed investing” or “seed financing”) 
but finding willing investors can be challenging.3 Young startups’ valuation difficulties
are a major factor because reasonable investors are less likely to invest when they cannot 
confidently value an opportunity.4
Partly in response to the valuation challenge, specialized startup investors—such as 
venture capital firms, angels, and accelerators5 (collectively, “Specialized Startup 
Investors”)—evolved how they contract for seed investments.6 Historically, they invested 
in young-startups by buying stock.7 However, in the mid-2000s, Specialized Startup 
Investors started using deferred-equity investment contracts (or deferred-equity 
instruments) as an alternative to stock. It began with convertible notes around 2005,8
                                                        
1. See, e.g., ASWATH DAMODARAN, THE DARK SIDE OF VALUATION: VALUING YOUNG, DISTRESSED, AND 
COMPLEX BUSINESSES 11 (3d ed. 2018) [hereinafter DARK SIDE OF VALUATION]. 
 2. “A unicorn is a term used in the venture capital industry to describe a privately held startup company with 
a value of over $1 billion.” James Chen, Unicorns, INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 15, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/unicorn.asp. 
 3. Jeffrey Sohl, The Changing Nature of the Angel Market, in 2 HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON VENTURE 
CAPITAL: A GLOBALIZING INDUSTRY 17, 21–22 (Hans Landström & Colin Mason eds., 2012). 
4. See ASWATH DAMODARAN, DAMODARAN ON VALUATION: SECURITY ANALYSIS FOR INVESTMENT AND 
CORPORATE FINANCE 1 (2d ed. 2006)  [hereinafter DAMODARAN ON VALUATION] (“Knowing what an asset is 
worth and what determines that value is a prerequisite for intelligent decision making—in choosing investments 
for a portfolio, in deciding on the appropriate price to pay or receive in a takeover, and in making investment, 
financing, and dividend choices when running a business . . . . A postulate of sound investing is that an investor 
does not pay more for an asset than it is worth.”). 
 5. Venture capital firms, angels, and accelerators are defined in infra Part I. 
6. See John F. Coyle & Joseph M. Green, Contractual Innovation in Venture Capital, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 
133, 133–34, 160–62 (2014) [hereinafter Coyle & Green (2014)]. 
7. Id. at 146–51, 154; John F. Coyle & Joseph M. Green, The SAFE, the KISS, and the Note: A Survey of 
Startup Seed Financing Contracts, 103 MINN. L. REV. 42, 43–44 (2018) [hereinafter Coyle & Green (2018)]. 
 8. Coyle & Green (2014), supra note 6, at 136; J. Brad Bernthal, The Evolution of Entrepreneurial Finance: 
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followed by the simple agreement for future equity (the “safe”)9 in 2013,10 and the Keep 
It Simple Security (the “KISS”) in 2014.11 Each of these instruments allows investors to 
thoughtfully invest in young startups without valuing them at the time of the seed 
investment. They allow future funding rounds to determine value when the startup is more 
mature and has an operating history that lends itself to valuation analysis. Over the last 
fifteen years, deferred-equity instruments have become important financing tools for 
young startups. 
Deferred-equity instruments were designed for a particular setting. They were 
designed for Specialized Startup Investors to use when investing in young startups with a 
reasonable chance of doing a future, traditional venture capital round. However, like many 
innovations, deferred-equity instruments’ usage expanded beyond its original purpose. 
Once Regulation Crowdfunding (Regulation CF) came into effect on May 16, 2016,12
issuers started using deferred-equity instruments to raise capital from public investors 
through funding portals. Is that good or bad? Does valuation deferral, which is beneficial 
for Specialized Startup Investors, also benefit public investors in Regulation CF offerings? 
Or, do these instruments create problems that make them generally unsuitable for 
Regulation CF offerings? The suitability of deferred-equity instruments for Regulation CF 
offerings drew the attention of a few scholars in 201613 and the United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) in 2017,14 but the issue has since largely faded 
into the background. Meanwhile, deferred-equity instruments have become a prominent 
financing choice for Regulation CF issuers. 
Despite its indispensable role in startup investing, valuation receives little attention 
from legal academics and policymakers. This article explicitly considers valuation in its 
analysis of deferred-equity instruments. Financial investors make investments to generate 
future cash flows. The fundamental value of any financial investment is the present value 
                                                        
 9. Safe is an acronym for “simple agreement for future equity.” While each letter in an acronym is often 
capitalized (e.g., AIDS or NASA), Y Combinator decided to write the word in lower case. Paul Graham, 
Announcing the Safe, a Replacement for Convertible Notes, Y COMBINATOR (Dec. 6, 2013), 
https://blog.ycombinator.com/announcing-the-safe-a-replacement-for-convertible-notes/ [hereinafter Graham 
(2013)] (“‘Safe’ comes from ‘Simple agreement for future equity.’ Although the name is an acronym, we got 
tired of typing ‘SAFE’ all the time when talking about it, and we’ve already switched to lowercase.”). Since the 
first safe was invented by Carolyn Levy, a Y Combinator partner, this article adopts Y Combinator’s lowercase 
“safe” spelling. 
10. Id. (“YC partner (and lawyer) Carolyn Levy has created a new alternative to convertible notes, called a 
safe, that has the advantages of convertible debt without some of the disadvantages.”). 
 11. Gregory Raiten, 500 Startups Announces ‘KISS’, 500 STARTUPS BLOG (July 3, 2014), https://500.co/kiss/ 
(“We’re thrilled to announce a totally unsexy, yet super useful, set of legal documents for founders and investors 
affectionately called the KISS (‘Keep It Simple Security’).”). 
 12. The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (the “JOBS Act”) was signed into law on April 5, 2012. Pub. 
L. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012). Title III of the JOBS Act established the foundation for a retail securities 
crowdfunding exemption (the “Title III exemption”) that is codified in sections 4(a)(6) and 4A of the Securities 
Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d(a)(6), 77d-1. To implement the Title III exemption, the SEC promulgated a set of 
rules referred to as “Regulation Crowdfunding” or “Regulation CF.” 17 C.F.R. §§ 227.100 et seq. The SEC 
adopted the final rules on October 30, 2015, which mostly took effect on May 16, 2016. See Crowdfunding, 
Securities Act Release No. 33-9974 (Oct. 30, 2015). 
 13. Joseph M. Green & John F. Coyle, Crowdfunding and the Not-So-SAFE SAFE, 102 VA. L. REV. ONLINE
168 (2016) [hereinafter Green & Coyle (2016)]. 
14. See, e.g., Investor Bulletin: Be Cautious of SAFEs in Crowdfunding, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (May 
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of those projected future cash flows.15 Equity investors have a residual claim to the 
corporation’s assets (its excess cash after creditors have been paid, or what this article 
refers to as the “residual”), which they generally collect through dividends and liquidation 
distributions. The value of a share of stock, therefore, should reflect the present value of 
the future dividends and liquidation distributions that share projects to generate for a 
stockholder.16 Predicting those future payments fundamentally requires forecasting the 
company’s future profits or cash flows and assessing the risk associated with this future 
performance.17 While these tasks are always challenging, even for mature, publicly traded 
companies, they are unavoidably difficult for young startups for two principle reasons.18
First, projecting future profits/cash flows for a new venture without any meaningful 
operating history is very difficult and is often little better than guesswork. Second, the 
projections are usually subject to extreme uncertainty. 
Conventional stock deals are commonly referred to as “priced rounds” or “priced 
equity.”19 When investors buy stock, they purchase an ownership percentage in the 
company. To price that percentage, the company and the investors must agree on a 
company valuation. If the parties cannot agree, the company cannot be priced, and no 
investment takes place. With deferred-equity instruments, investors still purchase a 
percentage of the company. However, the percentage amount is not determined until a 
later date, typically when a future stock offering occurs. Pricing is thus deferred to the 
subsequent offering. Deferred-equity instruments change the investment analysis from 
forecasting a young startup’s future profits/cash flows and accounting for their uncertainty 
(which is unavoidably difficult) to predicting whether it will conduct a future, high-quality 
stock offering (which is a manageable task for Specialized Startup Investors). 
Finding seed funding solutions for young startups is critical. Young startups need 
capital to launch and grow. Without this capital, fewer startups are formed and more fail. 
Deferred-equity instruments offer a partial solution by helping issuers and investors avoid 
the typical young-startup valuation challenge. Over roughly the last ten years, US seed 
financing has exploded for the traditional startup market20—which consists of Silicon 
Valley-style startups that raise capital from Specialized Startup Investors—and deferred-
equity instruments have helped. This article examines how valuation deferral works and 
explains why these instruments make a positive contribution to the traditional startup 
market. They allow expert investors to make thoughtful investments in an inherently 
uncertain environment. 
However, the spread of deferred-equity instruments to the Regulation CF market is 
a different matter. This article examined the Regulation CF offerings on three popular 
                                                        
 15. JANET KIHOLM SMITH, RICHARD L. SMITH & RICHARD T. BLISS, ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE:
STRATEGY, VALUATION & DEAL STRUCTURE 342 (2011). 
16. See discussion infra Part II.B.1. 
 17. DARK SIDE OF VALUATION, supra note 1, at 29. 
18. See generally SMITH, SMITH & BLISS, supra note 15, at 342.
19. Priced Round, FUNDERSCLUB: EDUC. CTR., https://fundersclub.com/learn/glossary/q/priced-round/ (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2020). The FundersClub glossary uses the term “priced round.” However, the terms “priced 
equity” and “priced-equity round” are used interchangeably. 
 20. Coyle & Green (2018), supra note 7, at 42. (“Over the past decade, there has been an explosion in seed 
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funding portals21—Republic22; StartEngine23; and Wefunder24—to get an informed 
picture of Regulation CF deferred-equity offerings. The examination consisted of all the 
Regulation CF deals funded through those three portals during 2019 (the “Study”). The 
Study captured 205 funded deals, of which seventy-one were safe offerings and twenty-
two were convertible note offerings. It examined the deferred-equity issuers and the terms 
of their instruments. Based on that review, this author concludes that most of the deferred-
equity offerings in the Study are very risky investments that do not appear to offer 
investors enough upside potential to offset the risk. More specifically, this author 
concludes: 
Most of the issuers appear unlikely ever to raise money from venture capital 
firms. 
The instruments’ terms are very issuer friendly. The instruments are far more 
favorable to issuers than one would expect for such high-risk investments. 
The issuer-friendly terms raise concerns that Regulation CF investors lack the 
sophistication to understand and internalize the risks and terms of their 
investments. 
While deferred-equity instruments have been a positive innovation for the traditional 
startup market (facilitating informed capital raising for young startups), they are not 
performing a similar role in the Regulation CF market. In the Regulation CF market, these 
instruments allow issuers to transfer very high-risk investments to public investors while 
generally limiting the investors’ upside potential. Although a few deals may turn out to be 
successful, this arrangement is unlikely to produce a sustainable source of capital for 
young startups, but it is likely to harm public investors. To address the problem, this article 
recommends that the SEC or FINRA25 impose a suitability duty on funding portals that 
host Regulation CF deferred-equity offerings. 
This article proceeds as follows: Part I explains a typical startup’s life and funding 
cycle. Part II presents a valuation overview for startups. The overview highlights the 
unavoidable valuation challenges that young startups and their investors face. Part III 
examines Specialized Startup Investors’ use of deferred-equity instruments in the 
traditional startup market and explains how they help these investors overcome the 
valuation challenges so they can make thoughtful seed investments. Part IV examines the 
use of deferred-equity instruments in Regulation CF offerings and explains their 
shortcomings. Part IV also explains how a suitability duty should be imposed on funding 
portals to protect public investors. Finally, Part V offers a conclusion. 
                                                        
 21. Sherwood Neiss, Today’s Best Crowdfunding Platforms—By the Numbers, VENTUREBEAT (June 9, 
2018), https://venturebeat.com/2018/06/09/todays-best-crowdfunding-platforms-by-the-numbers/. 
 22. REPUBLIC, https://republic.co/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2020). 
 23. STARTENGINE, https://www.startengine.com/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2020). 
 24. WEFUNDER, https://wefunder.com/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2020). 
 25. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. “FINRA is authorized by Congress to protect America’s
investors by making sure the broker-dealer industry operates fairly and honestly. [FINRA oversees] more than 
634,000 brokers across the country—and analyze[s] billions of daily market events.” About FINRA, FINRA, 
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I. A STARTUP’S LIFE AND FUNDING CYCLES
Defining “startups” upfront is useful. Startups are recently formed companies that 
start small but are built to grow rapidly and have the potential to become the large, 
dominant companies of the future. The high-technology companies congregating in 
Silicon Valley epitomize the US startup. They differ from most small businesses—such as 
local restaurants, owner-operated convenience stores, hair salons, and local construction 
companies—that are built to provide an income for the founders (“livelihood 
businesses”).26 Unlike startups, livelihood businesses are low-growth ventures with no 
realistic hope of ever becoming large, dominant companies. 
Like all businesses, startups must progress through a life cycle. While there is no 
single formulation for the startup life cycle,27 this article divides it into four stages. 
(1) Idea stage. The startup is just beginning and must determine whether the 
business venture is worth pursuing. For example, the founders have an idea for 
a new product, but have yet to develop a proven prototype. 
(2) Development stage. The startup’s concept shows promise. For example, the 
technology has been shown to work (e.g., a prototype has been built and tested), 
supply chains and production lines have been developed, and the company is 
prepared to commercially introduce its product. However, sales have not yet 
begun. 
(3) Sales-introduction stage. The startup has started production and has some 
sales. For example, the technology is being sold and showing some commercial 
viability. The rapid sales expansion that characterizes startups, however, has not 
yet taken place. 
(4) Rapid-growth stage. The startup is relatively mature and has shown success at 
scaling up its business. This is the rapid-growth phase for the startup. 
Because startups are built for growth, they generally must sacrifice near-term 
profitability and endure years of losses. Losses are often moderate during the idea stage 
but accelerate during the development stage as the startup undertakes the expense of 
product development and building a functioning commercial enterprise. Sales begin in the 
sales-introduction stage. As sales increase, losses should eventually start to slow. Sales 
grow rapidly in the rapid-growth stage. If the startup is to become a successful, sustainable 
company, this is when it becomes profitable. Figure 1 shows a startup’s life cycle along 
with a possible revenue and loss/profit performance through the four stages. 
                                                        
 26. By some estimates, livelihood businesses account for more than ninety percent of US small businesses. 
DANIEL SANDLER, VENTURE CAPITAL AND TAX INCENTIVES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CANADA AND THE 
UNITED STATES 2 (2004). 
 27. For example, Janet Kiholm Smith, Richard L. Smith, and Richard T. Bliss divide new venture 
development into six stages: (1) Opportunity; (2) Research and Development; (3) Start-up; (4) Early-growth; (5) 
Rapid-growth; and (6) Exit. SMITH, SMITH & BLISS, supra note 15, at 15–17. Luisa Alemany and Job J. Andreoli 
divide new venture development into four stages: (1) Seed; (2) Startup; (3) Growth; and (4) Maturity. Luisa 
Alemany & Job J. Andreoli, Introduction to Entrepreneurial Finance, in ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE: THE ART 
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Figure 1 
Startup Life Cycle28
Startups need funding to advance through their life cycles. Few founders have 
enough resources to self-finance their startups through profitability. Founders usually 
provide the initial funding, then look to external funding sources. Some of the more 
important external investors are: (1) friends and family; (2) accelerators; (3) angels; and 
(4) venture capital firms. 
(1) Friends and family are, as the description suggests, the founders’ friends and 
family members who are willing to provide funding.29
(2) Accelerators are highly selective programs that help speed up the business 
development process for young startups. Accelerators bring in cohorts of 
startups for an intense, immersive experience. Most programs have a fixed term 
(often three months) during which time the startups work with a group of 
mentors to jumpstart their businesses.30 An accelerator makes money by 
investing small amounts in its startups.31
(3) Angels are wealthy individuals who invest their own capital directly in startups. 
Beginning in 1996 with Band of Angels, many angels do their investing through 
                                                        
 28. This diagram was motivated by a diagram produced by Aswath Damodaran in DARK SIDE OF 
VALUATION, supra note 1, at 260. 
 29. Because friends and family often invest for altruistic reasons, rather than purely profit-driven ones, they 
can provide some of the fastest and most favorable capital. It also helps explain why friends and family investors 
are often pejoratively referred to as “friends, family, and fools.”
 30. Susan G. Cohen & Yael V. Hochberg, Accelerating Startups: The Seed Accelerator Phenomenon, 9–12 
(Mar. 30, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2418000; C. Scott Dempwolf, Jennifer 
Auer, Michelle D’Ippolito, Innovation Accelerators: Defining Characteristics Among Startup Assistance 
Programs, SMALL BUS. ADMIN., OFF. OF ADVOC. 3–5 (Oct. 2014), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/rs425-
Innovation-Accelerators-Research-Summary-FINAL.pdf. 
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formal angel groups.32 The groups’ formalities vary considerably. Some are 
formal with full-time management and standardized investment practices, while 
some are quite informal.33
(4) Venture capital firms come in several forms, but most are professionally 
managed funds. Outside investors—such as pension funds, insurance 
companies, university endowments, and extremely wealthy individuals—
commit money to a fund that is managed by professionals who are charged with 
“investment selection, working with entrepreneurs, and harvesting the 
investments.”34
The different investor types tend to focus on different stages in a startup’s life cycle. 
Friends and family are often the earliest external investors while venture capital firms are 
often the latest. Table 1 shows the stages in which the different funding sources tend to 
operate. 
Table 1 
Four Stages of a Typical Startup Funding Sequence 
Life-Cycle Stage Potential Investors 
Idea Stage Founders 
Friends and family 
Accelerators 
Development Stage Accelerators 
Angels 
Early-stage venture capital firms 
Sales-introduction Stage Angels 
Intermediate-stage venture capital firms 
Rapid-growth Stage Late-stage venture capital firms 
Angels 
Seed financing—which is often used to fund research, product development, and the 
rollout of the company’s product or service—comes before the traditional venture capital 
financing rounds that are commonly labeled Series A rounds, Series B rounds, and 
onwards.35 The Series A, Series B, and onward rounds are when the startup sells 
convertible preferred stock to investors. When venture capital firms (or angels) are willing 
to conduct Series A rounds changes over time. Sometimes venture capital firms are willing 
to invest earlier in the life cycle, sometimes later. However, what is generally constant is 
a desire to see meaningful sales and business traction. As a result, the seed stage typically 
begins during a startup’s idea or development stage and runs into its sales-introduction 
stage.  
                                                        
 32. Sohl, supra note 3, at 29. 
33. Id. at 29–35.
 34. SMITH, SMITH & BLISS, supra note 15, at 41. 
 35. The “Series A,” “Series B,” and onward labels come from the fact that venture capital firms typically 
receive convertible preferred stock when they invest. Because each round of convertible preferred stock has its 
own specific terms, each requires a unique label. The first round is commonly labeled Series A, the second round 
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II. VALUING YOUNG STARTUPS 
Valuation is a prerequisite to thoughtful investing. Putting aside for a moment what 
“value” means, reasonable investors seek investments offering the best value. If an 
investor is considering whether to make an investment, it wants to determine the 
investment’s value and compare it with the acquisition cost. If an investor is choosing 
between different investments, it wants to choose the most valuable one. Investors cannot 
make these determinations unless they can value their investment opportunities, which 
leads to the fundamental proposition: Thoughtful investors should not invest in young 
startups unless they can value the opportunity. This Part looks at the challenges analysts 
face when valuing young startups. Understanding these challenges helps lawyers, 
academics, lawmakers, and regulators better understand deferred-equity instruments. An 
understanding of valuation is necessary to provide guidance on how to use the instruments, 
when to use them, and when to avoid them.  
A. Financial Instruments  
Financial investments involve buying and selling rights to future cash flows.  
Issuers sell rights to future cash flows in order to receive immediate cash.  
Investors pay immediate cash to buy the issuers’ rights to future cash flows.
For example, assume TechCo, a startup, issues $10 million of common stock to a 
group of investors. TechCo receives $10 million of immediate cash to grow the company. 
However, it gives up a portion of its future cash flow rights to the investors. The investors 
part with $10 million of cash, but they receive a pro rata right to TechCo’s accumulated 
future cash flows, or its residual. TechCo does the deal because it believes the immediate 
cash is worth more than the future cash rights it is selling. The investors do the deal because 
they believe their right to TechCo’s future residual is worth more than the immediate cash 
they are giving up.  
Financial instruments are investment contracts that allow investors to buy, and 
issuers to sell, future cash flow rights. There are many types of financial instruments.36
One way to organize the concept is to classify financial instruments as loan-based (debt 
instruments) or ownership-based (equity instruments).37
Debt instruments. The issuer borrows money from investors in exchange for 
a repayment promise. The issuer promises to repay the amount borrowed (the 
principal) as well as pay interest to compensate investors for lending the 
money. The investors’ future cash rights are the principal and interest 
payments.
Equity instruments. The issuer sells investors an ownership stake in the 
company. Because so many startups are corporations, this article focuses on 
corporate equity instruments, or stock. Stockholders receive rights to the 
corporation’s residual, which they generally collect through dividends and 
liquidation distributions.
                                                        
 36. For an accessible introduction to financial instruments, see FRANK J. FABOZZI, FRANCO MODIGLIANI &
FRANK J. JONES, FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS (4th ed. 2010). 
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Not all instruments fit neatly into one category or the other. The features of 
convertible notes, safes, and the KISS are discussed in detail below in Parts III and IV. 
However, to help readers understand how these instruments fit on the loan-based versus 
ownership-based spectrum and why they are classified as deferred-equity instruments, 
here is a cursory summary. 
Convertible notes are short-term loans that convert to equity if the startup 
completes a qualified future equity financing. They are debt instruments, 
meaning the startup must repay the principal and pay interest. However, unlike 
traditional debt, convertible note investors do not look to be repaid with cash. 
Instead, they hope to be repaid with shares from the qualified future equity 
financing. 
Safes are a contractual right to receive a startup’s stock if it completes a 
qualified future equity financing. Unlike convertible notes, safes do not require 
repayment. Investors purchase the safes and receive stock in the qualified 
future equity financing if it occurs. 
The KISS comes in two versions. There is a debt version that is comparable to 
a convertible note and an equity version that is comparable to a safe. Any 
references in this section to convertible notes can be read to include the debt 
version of the KISS. And any references to safes can be read to include the 
equity version of the KISS. 
Convertible notes fall into both the debt and equity categories. They are debt 
instruments for state lending law38 and Internal Revenue Service tax purposes.39 They also 
require principal repayment and earn interest. However, they derive most of their 
economic value from the equity securities into which they convert. Safes, on the other 
hand, do not fit neatly in either category. They do not require principal repayment or earn 
interest, so they are clearly not debt. Moreover, they do not entitle holders to an immediate 
ownership stake in the company. However, as with convertible notes, they grant investors 
a future right to equity securities.  
From an investor’s perspective, convertible notes and safes are best described as 
deferred-equity instruments. Investors buy them to obtain future ownership rather than 
immediate ownership. The cash flows investors buy are largely equity cash flows; namely, 
a right to the startup’s residual. Those cash flows are simply deferred. 
B. What Is Value? 
A valuation analysis seeks to determine something’s value. Most people intuitively 
appreciate what “value” means: it refers to the benefits that something produces.40 For a 
                                                        
 38. For example, California’s usury law limits interest rates on non-consumer loans to the higher of (a) ten 
percent or (b) five percent over the rate charged for advances to member banks by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
San Francisco on the twenty-fifth day of the month prior to the loan’s origination. CAL. CONST. art. XV, § 1. 
 39. Interest rates must not fall below Internal Revenue Service minimum interest rates, or they could trigger 
“original issue discount” consequences. I.R.C. § 1272(a). 
 40. There are many “value” definitions. For example, acquisition value, book value, enterprise value, fair 
value, fair market value, going-concern value, intrinsic value, investment value, liquidation value, and transaction 
value are all common value definitions. Each definition measures value differently and is used in a different 
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financial investor, the benefit is the future cash flows that come from the financial 
instrument. Thus, the value of a financial investment is the present value of its future cash 
flows.  
1. Stock and Its Future Cash Payments 
Over the last twenty years, several new financial instruments have emerged for 
funding startups,41 including tokens,42 venture debt,43 and revenue-based loans.44 While 
these new instruments expand startup funding options in some settings, the primary 
external capital sources for young startups are equity and deferred-equity instruments.45
Therefore, this article focuses its valuation discussion on stock and the future cash flows 
it generates for investors. 
Corporate stock comes in two basic flavors: common and preferred. Common stock 
is the classic equity instrument. It provides stockholders with rights to the corporation’s 
residual (see Figure 2). A corporation’s residual is its net assets after accounting for 
liabilities owed. Assuming a typical form of common stock, stockholders generally receive 
two economic rights from their stock, both of which relate to the corporation’s residual.
Dividends. If the corporation has a positive residual, it may distribute a portion 
of the residual to stockholders through dividends.46
Liquidation distribution. If the corporation is liquidated, its stockholders 
share equally in the corporation’s final residual after all its liabilities have been 
satisfied.47
The value of a share of common stock, therefore, should reflect the present value of 
the corporation’s future dividends plus its liquidation distribution. 
                                                        
financial investment) is the present value of the future benefits (such as cash flows or profits) that come from the 
asset or service. See DARK SIDE OF VALUATION, supra note 1, at 29. See also FABOZZI, MODIGLIANI & JONES,
supra note 36, at 3. 
 41. J. Brad Bernthal catalogued the new financial instruments in Bernthal, supra note 8, at 789–814. 
 42. Companies using blockchain technology may use tokens to raise capital. There are different types of 
tokens. Some blockchains require tokens to operate, with these tokens referred to as intrinsic, or native, tokens. 
Other tokens are not essential to the blockchain architecture, and instead represent a claim on an underlying asset. 
These other tokens are referred to as asset-backed tokens. Some blockchains, such as the Bitcoin blockchain, 
require intrinsic tokens to operate, while others do not. However, all blockchains can use asset-backed tokens. 
Blockchain companies can raise capital by selling asset-backed tokens to purchasers. 
43. See infra note 135. 
44. See id.
45. Startup Equity Investments: Introduction to Equity Investing in Early-Stage Startups, FUNDERSCLUB:
EDUC. CTR., https://fundersclub.com/learn/guides/understanding-startup-investments/startup-equity-
investments/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2020). 
46. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170. 
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Figure 2 
A Corporation’s Residual
What about investors who sell their shares before the corporation liquidates? While 
they do not receive all the dividends or the liquidation distribution, they are not left empty-
handed.48 They receive a lump-sum payment when they sell their shares that should 
approximate the value of the post-sale dividends and liquidation distribution.49 Thus, even 
when an investor intends to resell her common stock before liquidation, the stock’s value 
should reflect the present value of all the future dividends plus the liquidation distribution 
associated with the shares.  
If the corporation has multiple classes of stock (e.g., common and preferred stock), 
the stockholders’ residual rights can be more complex. Priorities and mandatory payments 
must be accounted for. However, the fundamental concept remains the same. The 
stockholders have rights to the corporation’s residual, which they collect through 
dividends and a final distribution.  
2. Profits, Free Cash Flows, and the Residual 
Where does the residual come from? The residual is the company’s excess cash—
after creditors have been paid and reinvestment needs have been met—that shareholders 
can receive. This excess cash comes from running a profitable business. Profits are a 
company’s revenues minus its expenses. Companies report profits in several different 
ways (e.g., gross profits, operating profits, pre-tax profits, and net income) based on which 
expenses are being deducted.50 In each case, the profit measurement provides useful 
information, but is an accounting number subject to various accounting rules. As a result, 
                                                        
 48. SMITH, SMITH & BLISS, supra note 15, at 353. 
49. See id.
 50. “Gross profit” measures a firm’s revenues minus its production costs. “Operating profit” measures a 
firm’s revenues minus its production costs and operating costs. “Pre-tax profits” measures a firm’s revenues 
minus its production costs, operating costs, interest expenses, and amortization/depreciation charges. It also 
includes any extraordinary income or expenses, but it does not deduct the firm’s income taxes. “Net income” is 





      05/15/2020   10:30:18
42208-tul_55-3 Sheet No. 64 Side A      05/15/2020   10:30:18
C M
Y K
ORCUTT J - FINAL FOR PUBLISHER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2020 9:49 AM 
2020] VALUING YOUNG STARTUPS IS UNAVOIDABLY DIFFICULT 481 
while profits are where the residual originates from, none of the profit measurements 
explicitly track the excess cash available to stockholders.  
Free cash flow is the more accurate source for the residual. Free cash flow is the 
extra cash produced by a company’s operations that stockholders could receive via 
dividends or the liquidation distribution. This article is not a valuation primer, so it will 
not dwell on the distinctions between free cash flow and profits. Instead, readers should 
know that free cash flow forecasts are derived from a company’s profit projections. There 
are a few ways to calculate free cash flows,51 but each approach begins with profit 
projections that are then adjusted to arrive at free cash flows.52 Readers can think of free 
cash flow forecasts as more refined profit forecasts. If profits cannot be estimated 
confidently, neither can free cash flows. 
C. Startup Valuation Methods 
There are many methods for valuing young startups, each with its own nuances. The 
underlying concept, however, is constant: An investment’s value is equal to the present 
value of the future cash flows it projects to generate. Some methods explicitly discount the 
present value of the future cash flows, while others try to indirectly infer that value.53 This 
article considers four of the more popular methods:54
(1) Discounted cash flow (DCF). 
(2) Relative value. 
(3) The venture capital method. 
(4) The First Chicago method. 
There is no single approach that is definitively the best method for all situations, and 
there are plusses and minuses to each method. However, it is important to note that each 
of the four methods described in this article—as well as most credible methods—require 
forecasting the startup’s profits or cash flows. If reasonable profit/cash flow forecasts 
cannot be generated, which is often the case for young startups, each of these methods 
struggle to generate a useful valuation result.  
1. Discounted Cash Flow 
A DCF analysis is arguably the most fundamental method for valuing financial 
investments,55 including startup equity investments. A DCF analysis seeks to determine a 
financial investment’s intrinsic value, as it directly measures the present value of the cash 
                                                        
51. See, e.g., DAMODARAN ON VALUATION, supra note 4, at 79–80. 
52. Id. at 80. 
 53. SMITH, SMITH & BLISS, supra note 15, at 347–48. 
54. See generally id. at 349; see also DARK SIDE OF VALUATION, supra note 1, at 317–20.
55. See ASWATH DAMODARAN, INVESTMENT VALUATION: TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES FOR DETERMINING THE 
VALUE OF ANY ASSET 11 (U. ed., 3d ed. 2012) [hereinafter INVESTMENT VALUATION] (“While discounted cash 
flow valuation is only one of the three ways of approaching valuation and most valuations done in the real world 
are relative valuations, it is the foundation on which all other valuation approaches are built. To do relative 
valuation correctly, we need to understand the fundamentals of discounted cash flow valuation. To apply option 
pricing models to value assets, we often have to begin with a discounted cash flow valuation. . . . Anyone who 
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flows the investment expects to produce.56
a. The Basic Formula 
The basic DCF formula is57:
where 
CF = cash flow 
CF1,2,3, etc. = the subscript refers to the period when the future cash flows are  
     generated 
n = last period cash flows are to be received 
r = discount rate 
There are many variations of the DCF model.58 However, the basic approach is 
consistent between all of them: project the investment’s cash flows by period and apply a 
discount rate to determine its present value. 
Example: Mary has an opportunity to buy a financial instrument from TechCo for $75,000. 
The instrument will pay Mary $10,000 for each of the next five years. At the end of five 
years, TechCo will repurchase the financial instrument from Mary for $50,000. Assume that 
five percent is a reasonable discount rate for Mary to apply. The financial instrument’s 
present value is $82,471, making it a good buy.  
b. Information Inputs When Running a DCF for a Startup  
Determining a startup’s equity value with a DCF calculation requires three sets of 
information inputs. An analyst must (1) project the future cash flows that are expected to 
come from owning the stock, (2) estimate a terminal value, and (3) estimate a discount 
rate.  
                                                        
 56. DAMODARAN ON VALUATION, supra note 4, at 10; DARK SIDE OF VALUATION, supra note 1, at 29. 
57. See INVESTMENT VALUATION, supra note 55, at 12; DARK SIDE OF VALUATION, supra note 1, at 2–3. 
 58. Damodaran explains: “There are literally thousands of discounted cash flow models in existence. 
Investment banks or consulting firms often claim that their valuation models are better or more sophisticated than 
those used by their contemporaries. Ultimately, however, discounted cash flow models can vary only a couple of 
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i. Free Cash Flows 
For public companies that pay dividends, some analysts ignore the liquidation 
distribution and focus on dividends as the sole source of investor cash flows. If the 
company continues in perpetuity, “the only cash flow you receive when you buy shares in 
a publicly traded firm is a dividend.”59 These analysts use the DCF analysis to value stock 
as the present value of its projected future dividends, which is referred to as the dividend 
discount model (DDM).60 The DDM approach is often used for determining whether 
publicly traded stocks are overpriced or a bargain. If the present value of the projected 
dividends is lower than the stock price, the stock is overpriced. And if the present value of 
the projected dividends is higher than the stock price, the stock is a bargain. The DDM 
approach can only be used for mature companies that already pay dividends,61 so it does 
not work for most startups and definitely does not work for young startups. Young startups 
lack the excess cash needed to pay dividends, and even when they become profitable, they 
usually choose to retain their earnings to fund more growth.62
With the DDM approach eliminated, analysts commonly use the startup’s free cash 
flows to approximate the stockholders’ future investment cash flows.63 As noted above, 
free cash flow is the extra cash produced by a company’s operations that stockholders 
could receive via dividends or the liquidation distribution. The DCF measures the present 
value of the startup’s projected free cash flows, or residual. The analyst must then 
determine the portion of the residual represented by each share of stock. 
ii. Terminal Value  
Companies can potentially last forever, so valuing a startup with a DCF analysis 
requires forecasting its free cash flows in perpetuity. However, projecting free cash flows 
beyond a few years is often impractical. It becomes more of a guessing game than 
thoughtful analysis. When a company produces free cash flows beyond the analyst’s 
ability to generate thoughtful estimates (the “projection period”), a “terminal value”
calculation is used to capture the post-projection-period cash flows.64 The analyst projects 
free cash flows for as many years as she feels confident in her projections, then concludes 
the DCF calculation with a terminal value that approximates the value of the future free 
cash flows from the end of the projection period until the end of time. The DCF formula 
                                                        
 59. Id. at 323. 
60. Id.
 61. Luisa Alemany, Valuation of New Ventures, in ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE: ART AND SCIENCE OF 
GROWING VENTURES  214, 218 (Luisa Alemany & Job J. Andreoli eds., 2018). 
62. See, e.g., Can Dividends Be Paid in Excess of Retained Earnings?, MOTLEY FOOL (Nov. 27, 2016), 
https://www.fool.com/knowledge-center/can-dividends-be-paid-in-excess-of-retained-earnin.aspx (“Retained 
earnings represent the accumulated earnings from a company since its formation. Most companies lose money 
when they first start up, and so for a time, their retained earnings will be negative. That’s one reason why most 
start-ups don’t pay dividends, in addition to the fact that new companies generally need to hold onto any cash 
they have to grow their business.”). 
63. See Alemany, supra note 61, at 217; see also SMITH, SMITH & BLISS, supra note 15, at 352–53. 
 64. INVESTMENT VALUATION, supra note 55, at 304; SMITH, SMITH & BLISS, supra note 15, at 388 (Smith et 
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with a terminal value is65:
When a valued item is expected to generate cash flows in perpetuity, analysts often 
calculate terminal value with the stable growth method.66 The stable growth method 
assumes the valued item will settle into a constant growth rate.67 It takes the projected 
cash flows from the final projection period and assumes they will grow at a constant rate 
in perpetuity. The formula for the stable growth method is68:
where 
CFf = free cash flow from the final period of the projection period 
g = the constant growth rate in perpetuity
r = discount rate 
iii. Discount Rate 
Why do the projected cash flows need to be present valued? The reason: the promise 
of receiving money in the future is worth less than an immediate payment of an identical 
sum. Discounting the future cash receipts is meant to approximate the rate of return an 
investor requires to buy the future cash flows. The discount rate has two components: (1) 
the return rate for investing in a risk-free asset; and (2) a risk premium.69
(a) Risk-Free Rate 
The time value of money recognizes the value of having money in hand. Money-in-
hand can be invested in profitable projects (e.g., it can be deposited in the bank and earn 
interest), while future payments cannot. When a party defers receipt, she sacrifices these 
investment opportunities. Additionally, inflation eats away at the value of future payments. 
Assuming a three percent inflation rate, receiving $1,000 in one year is worth only $971
today (or $1,000/1.03). Assuming a constant three percent inflation rate for ten years, 
$1,000 received at the end of the ten-year period is worth only $744 today (or 
$1,000/1.0310). Collectively, the lost-investment-opportunities rate plus the inflation rate 
represent a party’s “risk-free rate.”70 This is the return rate a party foregoes when it defers 
payments, but without considering any risk associated with those payments.  
                                                        
 65. INVESTMENT VALUATION, supra note 55, at 304. 
66. See DARK SIDE OF VALUATION, supra note 1, at 266–67. 
 67. INVESTMENT VALUATION, supra note 55, at 306. 
68. Id.; SMITH, SMITH & BLISS, supra note 15, at 391. 
 69. SMITH, SMITH & BLISS, supra note 15, at 354; SHANNON P. PRATT & ALINA V. NICULITA, VALUING A 
BUSINESS: THE ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF CLOSELY HELD COMPANIES 183 (5th ed. 2008); see also WILLIAM 
J. MURPHY, JOHN L. ORCUTT & PAUL C. REMUS, PATENT VALUATION: IMPROVING DECISION MAKING THROUGH 
ANALYSIS 151–54 (2012).
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(b) Risk Premium 
Parties could choose to commit all their funds to largely risk-free investments like 
United States Treasury bonds. To induce parties to pursue riskier projects, there must be a 
return above the risk-free rate that justifies the greater risk.71 This additional return is the 
risk premium. It addresses the risk, or uncertainty, surrounding the valued asset’s future 
performance. Projected payments are simply that; they are just projections. The risk 
premium tries to account for the risk that the amount and timing of the forecasted payments 
are wrong. The forecasted payments may be less than forecasted or take longer to generate 
than expected. The greater the risk, the higher the discount rate; and the higher the discount 
rate, the lower the present value of the projected free cash flows.
c. Simplified DCF Example 
The following simplified example demonstrates how a DCF can work to determine 
a company’s equity value.72
Example: An investor is considering investing $2 million in TechCo for a one-third 
ownership interest in the company. Assuming the $2 million cash infusion, the investor 
developed free cash flow projections for TechCo. The investor projected TechCo’s free cash 
flows for the next seven years, at which point it believes TechCo will reach a stable growth 
rate of three percent.  
Future Year 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Free cash 
flows 
$500,000 $2,000,000 $3,000,000 $4,000,000 $4,500,000 $4,800,000 $5,000,000 
Finally, the investor calculated its risk-free rate + risk premium for investing in TechCo as 
thirty percent. With this information in hand, the investor estimated a terminal value for 
TechCo of $19,074,074. 
 = $19,074,074 
Here is the DCF for TechCo’s free cash flow projections + terminal value using a thirty 
percent discount rate. The present value of TechCo’s projected free cash flows + terminal 
value is $10,377,080. 
Future Year 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Free cash 
flows 







$384,615 $1,183,432 $1,365,498 $1,400,511 $1,211,981 $994,446 $3,836,597 
Total present value at 30% discount rate   $10,377,080 
                                                        
71. Id. at 184. 
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The present value of the projected free cash flows + terminal value justifies the investment, 
since 33.3 percent of $10,377,080 is greater than $2 million. 
d. DCF Challenges for Young-Startup Valuations 
When measuring a young startup’s equity value with a DCF analysis, the 
information inputs are free cash flow projections, a discount rate, and a terminal value. If 
an analyst has perfect information inputs, the DCF analysis is a trivial exercise. The analyst 
can take her perfect information inputs, plug them into the DCF formula, and generate an 
accurate result that would lead to a perfect answer. However, these information inputs are 
subject to substantial uncertainty. Multiple futures with varying associated probabilities 
await any company. With young startups, the distribution of potential outcomes is usually 
very broad. In fact, the distribution of outcomes can be so broad for young startups that it 
jeopardizes the usefulness of the DCF value result. 
i. Projecting Free Cash Flows 
Projecting a startup’s free cash flows is inherently difficult. It typically includes 
analyzing, among other things: 
The current and future target market for the company’s products or services;
The company’s business plan for pursuing the market opportunities;
The company’s management team and its ability to successfully run the 
company; 
The quality of the company’s products or services, including the company’s 
ability to improve their quality over time; 
The strength of the company’s intellectual property rights;
The company’s investment plan and access to financing; 
The competitive landscape for the company’s market opportunities; and
The company’s historical track record.
With this type of information, one can begin to build a profit model for the startup’s 
future performance, which can then be adjusted to project free cash flows. For young 
startups—which lack meaningful operating histories and suffer from high failure rates—
generating such projections is often little better than guesswork. 
(a) No Meaningful Operating History 
Building a profit model requires forecasting the company’s revenues and costs. A 
common method is to forecast revenues, then estimate the costs for that level of revenue 
production to arrive at the profit estimates.73 Free cash flow estimates can be generated 
from the profit forecasts. Generating revenue and cost projections for young startups is 
particularly difficult due to extreme uncertainty about their future performance. Because 
young startups often introduce new technologies, pursue new markets, and are led by 
unproven managers, their futures are particularly uncertain. Will the new technology 
function effectively? Will customers embrace the technology? Will the technology be 
commercially scalable? Are the intellectual property rights strong enough to prevent 
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competitors, particularly larger ones, from taking away the opportunity? How sound is the 
startup’s strategy for pursuing the opportunity? Will the startup have enough financial 
resources to pursue the opportunity? How will the startup’s management team perform?
Forecasts are easiest to generate when there is a performance track record. It is easier 
to project future iPhone sales and costs than it is to project a startup’s brand-new disruptive 
technology. One of the most commonly used techniques for developing projections is to 
extrapolate future performance from a historical track record,74 and this technique is 
simply not available for young startups. Young-startup forecasts must be generated from 
scratch. While not impossible,75 it requires more investigation and, as noted above, 
involves much greater uncertainty. Practically speaking, when a startup lacks a meaningful 
operating history, analysts often become more reliant on the startup’s estimates and their 
accompanying biases,76 including the startup’s incentive to exaggerate its future results. 
(b) High Failure Rate 
Underlying any attempt to forecast a young startup’s profits/cash flows is the fact 
that most startups disappoint or fail. According to the Small Business Administration, only 
about half of small businesses survive the first five years of operation.77 The more specific 
statistics for startups are just as bleak. Citing research statistics from Harvard Business 
School senior lecturer Shikhar Ghosh, a 2011 article in Harvard Business School Working 
Knowledge offered the following sobering estimates.
Thirty to forty percent of startups will end up liquidating their assets with 
investors losing all (or most) of their investment. 
Seventy to eighty percent of startups will fail to generate investors’ projected 
return on investment. 
Ninety to ninety-five percent of startups will fail to generate the profit 
projections provided at the time of the investment.78
Because every young startup seeking capital claims it will be successful, investors 
are left with the difficult task of picking the winners from the losers. Investors must 
determine which young startups will achieve their profit projections and reach stable 
growth, knowing full well that most will not. Making this determination is more 
challenging when companies lack actual performance results to evaluate. 
ii. Choosing a Discount Rate 
The discount rate’s risk-free component is usually easy to estimate. Analysts use the 
rate available on “instruments that are considered to have virtually no possibility of default, 
                                                        
 74. SMITH, SMITH & BLISS, supra note 15, at 208–11. 
75. Id. at 212–22, for example, details several techniques; see also DARK SIDE OF VALUATION, supra note 1, 
at 276–90. 
 76. DARK SIDE OF VALUATION, supra note 1, at 265. 
 77. Frequently Asked Questions About Small Business, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., OFF. OF ADVOC. (Sept. 
2019), https://advocacy.sba.gov/2019/09/24/frequently-asked-questions-about-small-business/. 
 78. Carmen Noble, Why Companies Fail—and How Their Founders Can Bounce Back, HARVARD BUS. SCH.
WORKING KNOWLEDGE (Mar. 7, 2011), https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/why-companies-failand-how-their-
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such as United States Treasury obligations.”79 When valuing cash flows that extend far 
into the future, such as when valuing a company, most analysts use the rate from a long-
term Treasury bond (e.g., the ten-year or twenty-year United States Treasury bond).80
The challenging part of estimating a discount rate for a young startup is the risk 
premium. With a traditional DCF analysis, the risk premium tries to capture all the young 
startup’s uncertainty. A single number seeks to account for all the ways the forecasted free 
cash flows could turn out different than the analyst’s singular projected future. This is a 
blunt technique for addressing the distribution of potential outcomes. Standard approaches 
for estimating the risk premium (or at least a portion of the risk premium) are not well 
suited for young startups.81 The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), for example, 
measures a stock’s risk by examining its price fluctuations in comparison to the overall 
market.82 Since young startups’ stocks are not publicly traded, there are no price 
fluctuations to compare to the overall market. Proxies can be used for the price of the 
young startup’s stock, but those proxies are often complicated83 and present their own 
challenges. Moreover, CAPM does not capture the startup’s failure risk,84 which must be 
separately estimated. 
Recognizing the challenges in developing the risk premium, some analysts try to 
account for risk directly in their free cash flow forecasts. For example, rather than forecast 
a single, possible set of free cash flows, an analyst may forecast multiple free cash flow 
scenarios and assign probabilities to each scenario.85 The benefit of the multiple-scenario 
approach is it reduces the risk premium, making the discount rate easier to calculate. The 
downside, however, is the challenge of generating multiple scenarios and coming up with 
thoughtful probabilities. 
iii. Terminal Value Problems  
Using a terminal value to complete a young startup’s DCF analysis presents serious 
problems. As noted above, the stable growth method is commonly used to calculate 
terminal value when valuing a company. However, it is not well suited for young startups. 
A young startup may not become a stable growth firm for a long time (e.g., ten years, 
twenty years, or more). This means the analyst may need to project free cash flows far into 
the future—beyond her ability to generate thoughtful estimates. The late-year free cash 
flow projections may be pure conjecture, rather than thoughtful analysis, and the same 
holds true for the discount rate. Compounding matters, terminal value often accounts for 
a large portion of a young startup’s overall value. Professor Damodaran notes that it is 
“not unusual for the terminal value to account for 90%, 100%, or even more than 100% of 
                                                        
 79. PRATT & NICULITA, supra note 69, at 183; see also DAMODARAN ON VALUATION, supra note 4, at 35–
36. 
 80. PRATT & NICULITA, supra note 69, at 184 (referencing the twenty-year Treasury bond); DAMODARAN 
ON VALUATION, supra note 4, at 35–36 (referencing the ten-year Treasury bond). 
81. See DARK SIDE OF VALUATION, supra note 1, at 265. 
 82. INVESTMENT VALUATION, supra note 55, at 183. 
83. See DARK SIDE OF VALUATION, supra note 1, at 290–96. 
84. See id. at 266. 
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the current value of a young [startup].”86 This means the valuation analysis is driven by a 
calculation that comes from numbers that may be little more than guesswork.  
iv. Summary of the DCF Challenges 
Valuing young startups with DCF models is unavoidably difficult for investors. 
They must project very uncertain free cash flows, usually before the startup has made its 
first sale. They must come up with an appropriate discount rate that accounts for this 
extreme uncertainty. And finally, they must estimate a terminal value that is itself 
dependent on free cash flow projections and the discount rate, and that will likely account 
for a substantial portion of the startup’s overall value. 
2. Relative Value 
Relative valuation (also referred to as “comparable valuation”)87 takes a different 
approach than a DCF analysis. Rather than directly estimate an asset’s intrinsic value, the 
relative valuation method measures value by looking at how others have priced the same 
or similar assets. It uses the wisdom and experience of self-interested buyers and sellers to 
estimate value.88 If the comparable transactions took place in a competitive market, it is 
reasonable to assume that past buyers and sellers, in the aggregate, agreed to an appropriate 
price. Typical characteristics for a competitive market are: (a) numerous buyers and 
sellers; (b) each of the buyers and sellers is well informed about the merits of the 
transaction; (c) the traded items are homogeneous (or fungible); (d) the buyers and sellers 
are independent, profit-maximizers; and (e) the transaction costs for making an exchange 
are low.89
Apple’s common stock, which trades on NASDAQ, provides a good competitive 
market example.  
Numerous buyers and sellers: The average trading volume for Apple’s 
common stock is over twenty-five million shares.90
Well-informed buyers and sellers: The buyers and sellers benefit from an 
extensive mandatory disclosure system for publicly traded stocks, as well as an 
array of market intermediaries (such as research analysts, credit rating 
agencies, and the financial press) that also inform transactions. Additionally, 
information about stock quotes and transaction prices is freely available. 
Homogenous items: Each share of Apple common stock is identical. 
Buyers and sellers are independent, profit-maximizers: Most investors are 
independent, profit-maximizers. They act in their own best interests to generate 
investment returns. 
Low transaction costs: The cost to make a trade is very low—usually just a 
                                                        
86. DARK SIDE OF VALUATION, supra note 1, at 266. 
87. See, e.g., SMITH, SMITH & BLISS, supra note 15, at 349. 
 88. MURPHY, ORCUTT & REMUS, supra note 69, at 189. 
89. See id. at 191. 
 90. Apple Inc. (AAPL): Summary, YAHOO! FINANCE,
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small sales commission.91
Because Apple’s common stock involves identical items trading on a highly 
competitive market, its announced stock price provides a reasonable estimate of its value. 
Similar analyses can be done for barrels of crude oil, bushels of soybeans, or any other 
identical items trading on competitive markets. 
a. Standardizing Values with a Ratio Analysis 
What if an analyst wants to use past sales of a comparable item to value something 
that is not identical? Assume a homebuyer wants to compare home prices in a 
neighborhood. Some homes are bigger than others and sell for higher prices, and most of 
the recent sales were for big homes. Can the homebuyer use the big-home sales to price a 
small-home sale? Yes. She could use a ratio analysis.92 A ratio analysis allows for apples-
to-apples comparisons between comparable, but different assets. It evaluates relationships 
between the sales price of similar assets and one or more relevant variables.93 The similar 
assets’ sales price is divided by the variable.
Ratios allow analysts to standardize values by correlating asset prices to the common 
variable. The price-per-square-foot ratio used in the real estate industry offers one of the 
clearest examples. If homes in a neighborhood are selling for $200 to $250 per square foot, 
a buyer looking for a 2,000 square foot home knows to be prepared for prices in the 
$400,000 to $500,000 range,94 while a buyer looking for a 3,000 square foot home knows 
to be prepared for prices in the $600,000 to $750,000 range.95
Any variable that correlates with price can be used in a ratio analysis. In the above 
real estate example, square-footage is the variable. The underlying assumption is that the 
ratio between the variable and price can then be applied to a comparable situation where 
only the variable is known. This relationship can be expressed with the following equation: 
Where 
EV1 = Economic variable for item 1  
P1 = Observed price for item 1 
EV2 = Economic variable for item 2 
P2 = Expected price for item 2 
                                                        
 91. The Apple example largely came from MURPHY, ORCUTT & REMUS, supra note 69, at 191.
92. Id. at 205. 
93. Id.
 94. $200 per square foot x 2,000 square feet = $400,000; and $250 per square foot x 2,000 square feet = 
$500,000. 
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b. Valuing Public Companies with Ratios 
Ratios, also referred to as multiples, are commonly used to value public companies 
and their financial instruments. In fact, ratios are probably the dominant public company 
valuation method.96 One reason ratio analysis is so popular for public companies is that 
the ratios are easy to calculate, and the relevant data is plentiful (see Figure 3). There are 
publicly reported prices for stock sales as well as for sales of entire companies. And many 
possible variables—such as earnings, revenues, and book value—are also publicly 
reported.  
Figure 3 
Ratios for valuing companies 
Ratios can be used to generate valuation ratios for shares of stock or entire companies. 
Example: Alpha’s stock trades on NASDAQ for $30.00 per share. Alpha projects it will 
generate $2.00 of earnings-per-share next year. Alpha’s stock is trading at a price-to-earnings 
ratio of fifteen-times next year’s earnings-per-share.  
Example: Alpha recently acquired Beta in an M&A transaction for $100 million. At the time 
of the transaction, Alpha projected that Beta would generate $5 million of net income next 
year. Alpha purchased Beta at a price-to-earnings ratio of twenty-times next year’s net 
income. 
                                                        





      05/15/2020   10:30:18
42208-tul_55-3 Sheet No. 69 Side B      05/15/2020   10:30:18
C M
Y K
ORCUTT J - FINAL FOR PUBLISHER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2020 9:45 AM 
492 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:469 
Ratios can be generated using variables generated (a) in the past (“trailing ratios”), 
(b) in the current year (“current ratios”), or (c) in the next few years (“forward ratios”). 
Because stock/company valuations should be based on future performance (and the future 
residual), current and forward ratios are usually the more appropriate valuation tool.97
i. Earnings Ratios 
Earnings ratios are widely used for valuing public stocks and companies.98 This 
makes sense because the benefit stocks and companies generate for investors are future 
cash flows that come from the issuer’s profits. Price-to-earnings (PE) ratios use the 
company’s net income or net income-per-share, which is the bottom-line profit number. 
Earnings other than net income are also used for ratio analyses. For example, EBITDA 
(earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization) and EBIT (earnings before 
interest and tax) ratios are commonly employed.  
ii. Non-Earnings Ratios 
While earnings ratios make the most intuitive sense, since they clearly correlate with 
investor cash flows, any variable that correlates with price can be used. Price-to-revenue 
and price-to-book value99 ratios are examples of non-earnings ratios. 
iii. How a Ratio Analysis Works 
Using a ratio to value a company normally involves a three-step process.100
Step 1—Identify comparable stocks or companies with identifiable prices and 
profit forecasts. 
Step 2—Calculate earnings ratios for the comparable stocks or companies. 
Step 3—Adjust and apply the ratios to the company being valued. 
The following example uses forward PE ratios from recent comparable-company 
sales to value a target company in an M&A transaction. 
Example: Alpha is considering buying another company, Beta. Before commencing serious 
negotiations, Alpha conducted a PE ratio analysis to get a feel for Beta’s potential value 
range. 
Step 1—Identify comparables with known valuations and profit forecasts. 
Alpha identified four similar companies that were sold within the last few years—
let us call them Companies A, B, C, and D. These companies involved similar 
product profiles, market sizes, and results.  
                                                        
 97. Despite the greater valuation relevance of current and forward PE ratios, most financial websites and 
newspaper stock tables report trailing PE ratios. This likely stems from the ease of finding and using historical 
results. Current and forward PE ratios require projecting future results, which is a more challenging exercise. 
 98. DARK SIDE OF VALUATION, supra note 1, at 110. 
 99. For purposes of book value ratios, “book value” represents the net value of the company’s assets as 
reported on its balance sheet. 
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Acquisition Price 
Company A $1,000 million 
Company B $1,680 million 
Company C $300 million 
Company D $540 million 
In addition to knowing the companies’ acquisition prices, Alpha also knows their 
projected next-year net income at the time of the sale. 
Projected Next-Year Net 
Income at the Time of the Sale 
Company A $50 million 
Company B $70 million 
Company C $20 million 
Company D $30 million 
Step 2—Calculate valuation ratios for the comparables. With this information, 
Alpha generated valuation ratios for the comparable companies. 
Comparable Company PE Ratios 
A B C D










$50 million $70 million $20 million $30 million 
Acquisition price 
as a multiple of 
next-year’s net 
income 
20x 24x 15x 18x
Step 3—Adjust and apply the comparable valuation ratios to the asset being 
valued. The comparable companies sold for between fifteen-times and twenty-four-
times next-year’s net income. Alpha examined the comparable companies more 
carefully and believes that Beta is better than Company C, but not as good as 
Company B. Alpha may therefore want to use a valuation ratio of eighteen-times to 
twenty-times next-year’s net income. Alpha forecasts Beta’s net income for next 
year will be $4 million. As a result, a possible valuation range for Beta could be $72 
million to $80 million.
e. Challenges in Using Relative Valuations for Young Startups 
Despite near ubiquitous use in the public markets, relative valuation is not well 
suited for young startups. One entrepreneurial finance textbook goes so far as to say, “It is 
almost impossible to use the comparable method to estimate the value of a startup.”101
While that statement may be a bit strong, it is undeniable that using relative valuations is 
challenging for startups in general and extremely challenging for young startups.  
Relative valuations present several problems for young-startup valuations,102 but 
                                                        
101. See Alemany, supra note 61, at 219. 
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two problems particularly standout. The first is a lack of appropriate comparable 
companies. The comparables for young startups should be other private startups. However, 
since such comparables are not publicly traded, pricing data and profit projections are hard 
(or, often, impossible) to obtain. Without comparable prices and variables, ratio analyses 
cannot be done. Some analysts may try to use publicly traded companies for their ratio 
analyses. However, this is only appropriate for mature startups that are far enough along 
in their development cycle that comparing them to public companies is reasonable—which 
excludes young startups. Second, young startups lack the variables normally used in a ratio 
analysis. They do not themselves have meaningful revenues and their earnings are almost 
certainly negative.103
3. Venture Capital Method 
Due to the challenges presented by DCF and relative valuation analyses, some 
investors use an alternative approach—the venture capital method—for valuing 
startups.104 The venture capital method measures the present value of the startup’s 
estimated exit value. The formula for the venture capital method is105:
where 
r = target rate of return (or discount rate) 
n = period when the exit takes place 
Investors buy startup stock to make money, and the most common way to make that 
money is to sell the stock and collect capital gains. The venture capital method seeks to 
calculate the present value of the investors’ cash receipt when they exit their investment. 
There are two common exit strategies for startup investments. 
(1) IPO exits. The startup conducts an IPO and creates a public secondary market 
for its stock on a liquid stock exchange. Pre-IPO investors can sell their startup 
stock on the newly established secondary market. 
(2) Acquisition exits. The startup sells itself to another company. The acquirer 
purchases all, or substantially all, of the startup in exchange for cash or publicly 
traded stock. 
a. How It Works 
Valuing a startup with the venture capital method generally involves four steps106:
                                                        
problems.
 103. Some analysts overcome the lack of current profits and revenues by forecasting “the firm’s operating 
results later in the life cycle . . . and use these forward revenues and earnings as the basis for valuation. In effect, 
we will estimate the value of the business in five years, using revenues or earnings from that point in time.”
DARK SIDE OF VALUATION, supra note 1, at 315. The future valuation would then need to be discounted back to 
present value. Forecasting a young startup’s future results and using them for the ratio analysis can work, but it 
suffers from the same forecasting and uncertainty problems discussed earlier for DCFs. 
104. Id. at 270; SMITH, SMITH & BLISS, supra note 15, at 367; Alemany, supra note 61, at 223–24. 
 105. DARK SIDE OF VALUATION, supra note 1, at 270. 
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Step 1—Estimate how much funding the startup needs to reach an exit event. 
Step 2—Estimate when the exit will occur. 
Step 3—Estimate the startup’s exit value, frequently using a PE ratio. 
Step 4—Discount the exit value back to present value using a target rate of 
return. 
The following example provides a simplified look at valuing a startup with the 
venture capital method. 
Example: A venture capital firm (VC) is considering whether to invest in TechCo. Following 
a detailed analysis of the market for TechCo’s product and TechCo’s ability to pursue the 
opportunity, VC made the following determinations: 
Step 1—Estimate how much funding TechCo needs to reach an exit event. VC 
estimates that TechCo needs $10 million of funding to reach an exit event. VC believes 
the exit event will be an acquisition exit. 
Step 2—Estimate when the exit will occur. VC believes that TechCo will be ready for 
the acquisition exit in three years. 
Step 3—Estimate TechCo’s exit value. Three comparable companies experienced 
acquisition exits within the last year. Those companies sold at PE multiples ranging 
from twenty-times to twenty-four-times forward one-year net income. VC projects that 
TechCo’s forward one-year net income will be $9 million at the time of exit. Therefore, 
TechCo’s future exit value projects to range from $180 million to $216 million. 
Step 4—Discount the exit value back to present value. Since the exit is not expected 
to occur for three years, the exit value must be discounted back to present value. Venture 
capital firms commonly develop rate-of-return tables based on the startup’s stage of 
development.107 VC judged TechCo to be a later stage company and determined thirty-
five percent to be the appropriate discount rate. 
where 
EV = exit value 
r = discount rate 
n        = the period when the exit value occurs 
If VC decides to make the $10 million investment, it will want to receive an ownership stake 
in TechCo in the range of at least eleven percent ($10 million/$87.8 million) to fourteen 
percent ($10 million/$73.2 million).   
The above example assumes that VC’s $10 million investment is enough to fund the 
startup through its exit. If additional funding is necessary to achieve the exit event, the 
calculations get more complicated because they must account for the ownership dilution 
that VC would experience. 
b. Venture Capital Method Challenges for Valuing Young Startups 
The venture capital method provides an advantage over a DCF analysis by reducing 
                                                        





      05/15/2020   10:30:18
42208-tul_55-3 Sheet No. 71 Side B      05/15/2020   10:30:18
C M
Y K
ORCUTT J - FINAL FOR PUBLISHER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2020 9:45 AM 
496 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:469 
the profit projection period. With a DCF analysis, the analyst must project the company’s 
free cash flows in perpetuity. When using the venture capital method, the analyst need 
only project profits (assuming an earnings ratio) for the anticipated exit year (which is 
often three to seven years in the future). While the projection period is shorter, the analyst 
must still build a profit model. For young startups, that means the analyst still has the 
challenge of building a profit model when future profits are likely to be highly uncertain. 
Developing profit projections for companies without reliable sales, which defines young 
startups, is an inherently difficult task even when the projection period is shortened. 
The venture capital method also presents an optimism bias challenge.108 The model 
projects a single, positive future event—the startup achieving an exit event—even though 
that event may not occur. Recall that most young startups fail and never achieve a 
successful exit. The discount rate (or target rate of return) is the primary tool for 
counteracting the optimism bias.109 The more confidence the analyst has in the startup 
reaching its exit event, the lower the discount rate. The less confidence the analyst has, the 
higher the discount rate. However, despite the discount rate’s critical importance to the 
valuation analysis, there is often little more than “intuition and experience” to guide the 
analyst’s discount-rate decision.110 Stated more frankly, the chosen discount rate may be 
little more than guesswork. 
4. First Chicago Method 
a. Variation of the Venture Capital Method 
The First Chicago method is a variation of the venture capital method that seeks to 
reduce the optimism bias. Rather than forecast one possible outcome, the venture capital 
method forecasts multiple scenarios. A common iteration forecasts three scenarios: 
success, failure, and sideways.111
The success scenario is usually the same as the venture capital method’s exit 
event.112
The failure scenario usually assumes a worst-case scenario. Not only does the 
startup fail to achieve an exit event, investors receive no return and lose their 
invested capital.113
The sideways scenario usually assumes a moderate performance level. There 
is no successful exit event, but the startup does not completely fail.114 For 
example, investors might recoup some or all their invested capital and possibly 
even receive a modest additional return.115
The First Chicago method accounts for each scenario by assigning it a probability 
weight. The investor must conduct a valuation for each scenario and assign a probability 
                                                        
 108. SMITH, SMITH & BLISS, supra note 15, at 368. 
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 369. 
112. See id.
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to its occurrence. The venture capital method can be used to determine the success 
scenario. If the investor anticipates the failure scenario involves a total loss of investment, 
then it can be valued at $0. Finally, the sideways scenario can be valued several different 
ways, including with a DCF analysis, a relative valuation, or the venture capital method, 
but assuming less-optimistic model inputs. The following example shows how the 
probability weighting works. 
Example: VC is once again considering whether to invest in TechCo. VC estimates that 
TechCo will need $10 million of funding to reach an exit event, which will take place in 
three years. Following a detailed analysis of the market for TechCo’s product and TechCo’s 
ability to pursue the opportunity, VC valued three scenarios (each three years in the future) 
and assigned them probabilities.
Expected Value Probability Weighted Value 
Success 
scenario 
$180 million to 
$216 million 






$10 million to $20 
million 
50% $5 million to $10 million 
Total weighted value $59 million to $74.8 million 
where 
WV = weighted value 
r = discount rate 
n        = the period when the scenarios are valued 
If VC decides to make the $10 million investment, it will want to receive an ownership stake 
in TechCo in the range of at least twenty-one percent ($10 million/$46.7 million) to twenty-
seven percent ($10 million/$36.8 million).  
As noted earlier, a major drawback of the venture capital method is its focus on a 
single, uncertain event. The analyst must then use a discount rate that is often quite high 
to account for the uncertainty. The discount rate then aggregates useful information about 
the potential future outcomes and hides it in a single number, which can fall prey to various 
biases and problems.116 The First Chicago method forces the analyst to break the valuation 
problem into its individual parts and expressly analyze each factor. This  method accounts 
for more uncertainty than if the analyst forecasts only a single possible outcome. As a 
result, analysts should use a lower discount rate when employing the First Chicago 
method, compared to the venture capital method, since the risk component should be 
smaller. 
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b. First Chicago Method Challenges for Valuing Young Startups 
The First Chicago method requires building a similar profit model to the venture 
capital method. The venture capital method forecasting challenges apply equally to the 
First Chicago method. The First Chicago method does allow analysts to account for more 
uncertainty, which can make the model-building exercise easier. However, if the most 
important data remains largely guesswork, the analysis still struggles to generate a useful 
result. 
D. Valuation Challenges Discourage Investment 
Left unaddressed, the young-startup valuation challenge discourages investment. If 
rational investors cannot confidently value a company, they are less likely to invest. 
Because few entrepreneurs have enough resources to self-finance their startups through 
profitability, less investment capital leads to fewer startup formations, less young-startup 
growth, and more young-startup failures.  
No matter what method is used, the foundation of every valuation analysis is a three-
step process: 
(1) Collect information; 
(2) Run the information through an economically valid model; and 
(3) Interpret the results.117
A valuation model’s accuracy depends on the quality of its data. If the collected 
information is guesswork, then so too is the valuation result. In the case of young startups, 
their lack of operating history means they lack the data necessary to run robust valuation 
analyses. When coupled with their extreme uncertainty, valuing young startups will always 
be unavoidably difficult.   
A DCF analysis requires building the young startup’s profit model in 
perpetuity (or until the stable growth period is reached, which may be ten, 
twenty, or more years into the future). Without a track record to start from, the 
forecasts may be little more than guesswork. A DCF analysis also requires 
estimating the risk premium, but without the data that normally guides such 
analysis for public companies. 
A relative valuation requires comparing the young startup’s performance to 
comparable companies or comparable transactions. The young startup’s lack 
of operating performance means there are few, if any, meaningful comparables. 
Moreover, the young startup lacks the performance data needed to run the ratio 
analysis. 
A venture capital method analysis requires building a young startup’s profit 
model at the time of its exit for determining its exit value. This requires a 
shorter profit model than for a DCF analysis, but still requires building a profit 
model and coming up with a discount rate. 
A First Chicago method analysis requires building a similar profit model as 
for the venture capital method but allows the analyst to account for more 
potential outcomes. It suffers from the same forecasting problems as the 
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venture capital method.  
The young-startup valuation challenge is not a mere nuisance. It is a much more 
serious and fundamental challenge that does not lend itself to easy fixes. This article spent 
time explaining fundamental valuation analysis for startups to demonstrate this problem. 
Yes, models can be built for young startups that look impressive. However, if they are 
built on fanciful data, they are not very useful for guiding investment decisions. Using 
highly-speculative valuation analyses to make investment decisions creates several 
investing scenarios—none of which is optimal.  
Scenario 1—Throw caution to the wind. Investors can make their investment 
decisions based on highly speculative analysis. Such an approach creates a high 
likelihood of investors overpaying for their investments. 
Scenario 2—Only invest at bargain-basement prices. Investors can demand 
bargain-basement prices when investing. Investors demand such low prices 
that their portfolio companies do not need to perform all that well to justify the 
investment. Entrepreneurs are likely to resist this approach, since they could 
view it as giving away the company. 
Scenario 3—Avoid investing in young startups. Investors can simply choose 
not to invest in young startups.  
Until the mid-2000s, scenario 3 was frequently the choice for Specialized Startup 
Investors. Through much of the 1980s, venture capital firms actively invested in young 
startups.118 Beginning in the late 1980s, they largely abandoned early investing and shifted 
to later stages.119 The shift was not a temporary trend, but instead reflected a systematic 
change in the way venture capital firms operated.120 As venture capital firms exited the 
seed investing market, angels filled the role. During the 1990s, angels and venture capital 
firms operated in a complimentary relationship, where the angels provided “a kind of ‘farm 
system of venture portfolios.’”121 Angels enabled startups to grow to a point where they 
could attract venture capital interest. However, angel investors also began migrating from 
earlier financing rounds to later rounds during the early 2000s.122 Why were Specialized 
Startup Investors leaving the young-startup investment market? An inability to confidently 
value the investment opportunities was likely a significant factor. If these investors could 
accurately price deals, there would have been no reason for the mass migration. 
III. OVERCOMING THE YOUNG-STARTUP VALUATION CHALLENGE WITH DEFERRED-
EQUITY INSTRUMENTS
Priced equity transactions dominated the startup funding model until the mid-2000s. 
Entrepreneurs, friends and family, angels, and venture capital firms have traditionally 
                                                        
 118. SANDLER, supra note 26, at 8. 
119. Id.; MARK VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBERT J. ROBINSON, ANGEL INVESTING: MATCHING START-UP FUNDS 
WITH START-UP COMPANIES—THE GUIDE FOR ENTREPRENEURS, INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS, AND VENTURE 
CAPITALISTS 49–52 (2000). 
 120. Jeffrey E. Sohl, The U.S. Angel and Venture Capital Market: Recent Trends and Developments, 6 J. PRIV.
EQUITY 7, 13 (2003). 
 121. Jeffrey A. Timmons & Harry J. Sapienza, Venture Capital: The Decade Ahead, in THE STATE OF THE 
ART OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 402, 421 (Donald L. Sexton & John D. Kasarda eds., 1992). 
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financed startups by buying stock. When investors purchase stock, they buy a percentage 
of the startup, which first requires agreeing on a pre-money valuation for the company.123
If an investor wants to buy ten percent of a startup for $1 million, it must first determine 
the startup is worth $9 million. Priced equity rounds are susceptible to the young-startup 
valuation challenge because investments should not take place if the parties cannot agree 
on the valuation. In the mid-2000s, Specialized Startup Investors began using deferred-
equity instruments to overcome this problem.  
Even under the traditional funding model, many startup investors have learned to 
tailor their investment contracts to address various startup investing challenges. Venture 
capital firms and their use of convertible preferred stock offers the classic example. 
Investing in startups—whether young or mature—is difficult. Startup investments are 
plagued by uncertainty, information asymmetry, and agency problems124 that limit 
investors’ willingness to commit funds.125 All companies present investors with these 
problems, but startups are an extreme case. Venture capital firms mitigate the problems by 
employing a contract strategy that relies heavily on receiving convertible preferred 
stock.126 This strategy allows venture capital firms to stage their investments,127 control 
their portfolio companies,128 receive liquidation preferences and other downside economic 
protections,129 and incentivize the startup managers to run their companies 
successfully.130
                                                        
 123. Readers should understand the difference between a “pre-money” and a “post-money” value. Both 
measure a company’s value, but they do so at different times. Pre-money valuation is a company’s valuation 
before an investment round, while post-money valuation is company’s valuation after the investment. Assume 
an investor buys stock representing twenty-five percent ownership in a company for $5 million. The company’s
“post-money valuation” is $20 million (or $5 million/twenty-five percent). However, its pre-money valuation is 
$15 million, which is calculated as the post-money valuation minus the investment. 
 124. Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1405, 1407 
(2008) [hereinafter Ibrahim (2008)] (“Start-up investments are rife with uncertainty, information asymmetry, and 
potential agency costs in the form of potential opportunism by entrepreneurs.”). 
 125. PAUL A. GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, MONEY OF INVENTION: HOW VENTURE CAPITAL CREATES NEW 
WEALTH 23 (2001). 
 126. Ibrahim (2008), supra note 124, at 1407, 1411–16; GOMPERS & LERNER, supra note 125, at 41–59. 
 127. Venture capital firms usually stage their investments. Rather than fully fund the startup up front, they 
provide partial funding over multiple rounds. Each financing round is meant to finance the startup to a milestone. 
If the startup achieves the milestone, it receives more funding. If it fails to meet the milestone, the venture capital 
firm can abandon the investment. Staging helps reduce the uncertainty and information asymmetry problems, 
while also creating an incentive for management to do good work. 
Reduces uncertainty. Staging allows venture capital firms to replace projections about the startup 
with facts. 
Reduces information asymmetries. Staging provides venture capital firms with improved access 
to the startup’s most confidential information, particularly since the venture capital firm will likely 
receive board representation. 
Creates incentives. If the startup’s managers want more money for their company, they better work 
hard and meet the targeted milestones. 
 128. Venture capital firms obtain substantial control over their portfolio companies. This control generally 
stems from receiving board seats and special voting rights (e.g., class voting rights). 
 129. Preferred stock has a liquidation preference over common stock. 
 130. For example, the liquidation preference sets a tangible bar that management must reach before having 
any right to the startup’s future profits. The startup’s managers typically own common stock, which provides 
them a junior right to the residual. Because preferred stockholders collect their share of the residual first, 
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Venture capital firms’ convertible preferred stock contract strategy has been 
incredibly successful. It allows venture capital firms and other professional startup 
investors (such as angel syndicates) to thoughtfully invest tens of billions of dollars each 
year.131 The US startup market would not be what it is today without the convertible-
preferred-stock strategy. However, for all the problems it mitigates, convertible preferred 
stock does not address the young-startup valuation challenge, as priced rounds require 
valuing the startup. 
Deferred-equity instruments do address the young-startup valuation challenge. 
Convertible notes, safes and the KISS allow investors to thoughtfully invest in young 
startups without valuing them at the time of investment. Future funding rounds determine 
value when the startup is more mature and has an operating history. At that point, investors 
can better estimate the startup’s future performance and risk premium.  
Convertible notes, safes, and the KISS are all contractual instruments. This means 
that issuers and investors can modify them, and potentially substantially. Part III provides 
a general description of the different instruments as they are used in the traditional startup 
market and explains why these “classic versions” are a positive contribution to the 
traditional startup market. However, with the promulgation of Regulation CF in 2016, 
crowdfunding issuers also began using deferred-equity instruments to raise capital from 
the general public. The “crowdfunding version” of deferred-equity interests often differs 
from the classic version, and those differences are discussed in Part IV. 
A. Convertible Notes 
Traditional debt instruments, such as standard bank loans, are a primary funding tool 
for livelihood businesses.132 Young startups, however, are not built for such traditional 
debt133 and are largely excluded from the small-business-lending market.134 Nevertheless, 
there are a few debt instruments that startups can use to fund their growth.135 Convertible 
                                                        
 131. NIZAR TARHUNI ET AL., 2Q 2019 PITCHBOOK-NVCA VENTURE MONITOR, PITCHBOOK 10 (July 10, 
2019), https://pitchbook.com/news/reports/2q-2019-pitchbook-nvca-venture-monitor. Late-stage venture capital 
investments totaled $84.5 billion in 2018, $46.5 billion in 2017, $46.2 billion in 2016, $48.0 billion in 2015, and 
$44.6 billion in 2014. Id.
132. 2018 FDIC SMALL BUSINESS LENDING SURVEY, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. 1 (Dec. 2018), 
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/sbls/full-survey.pdf (“The survival and growth of small businesses depends 
on access to credit, and banks are the most common source of external credit for small firms.”). 
 133. They lack the excess cash flow needed for principal and interest payments and they also generally lack 
meaningful securable assets. 
134. See generally SMITH, SMITH & BLISS, supra note 15, at 52.
 135. In additional to convertible notes, other startup debt instruments include venture debt and revenue-based 
loans. 
Venture debt. Select lenders, such as specialty banks and venture debt firms, Bernthal, supra note 
8, at 798, provide traditional loans to startups that have obtained venture capital funding. Darian M. 
Ibrahim, Debt as Venture Capital, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1169, 1173 (2010). Ibrahim explains: 
Venture debt does not mean debt from angel investors or VCs that is commonly converted 
to equity; nor does venture debt mean loans to start-ups that have developed to the point of 
attractiveness to traditional lenders. Instead, venture debt as defined here is loans to early 
stage, rapid-growth start-ups that have no traditional means of paying it back.” Id. at 1171 
(footnote omitted). 
Revenue-based loans. Revenue-based loans (also referred to as “royalty financing”) are a form of 
debt. In exchange for a loan, the startup promises to pay the lender a percentage of defined, future 
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notes are one such debt option, and the only meaningful debt option for young startups.136
Convertible notes started becoming a popular option for seed investors around 2005,137
and have since become a staple for seed financing.138 Young startups commonly use them 
to raise modest sums (e.g., $500,000 to $1.25 million139), and it is often their first external 
funding round.140 Convertible notes are used when a young startup is close to ready for a 
meaningful venture-capital equity round.  
1. Automatic Conversion if a Qualified Equity Financing Occurs 
Convertible notes are short-term loans (e.g., one to three years) that convert to equity 
in a few scenarios. The standard scenario calls for automatic conversion if the startup 
conducts a qualified equity financing before the notes mature.141 A qualified equity 
financing is often defined as a priced round of preferred stock that meets a certain size 
threshold (such as $1 million of new cash raised).142 Convertible notes are debt 
instruments, meaning the startup must repay the principal and pay interest. However, 
unlike traditional debt, convertible note investors do not look to be repaid with cash—in 
fact, the notes should prohibit prepayments.143 Instead, they hope to be repaid with shares 
                                                        
Silchenko, There’s a New-Old Sheriff in Town: Royalty Financing for Young Ventures, HUFFPOST
(Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/theres-a-newold-sheriff-i_b_9295908; Scott 
Austin, An Alternative Financing Option for Start-ups—Entrepreneurs Going the Royalty Route Use 
a Share of Revenue to Pay Back Loans, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2010), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704679204575646940403312602; Cliff Ennico, 
Royalty Financing: The New Thing in Venture Capital, CREATORS (Nov. 21, 2017), 
https://www.creators.com/read/succeeding-in-your-business/11/17/royalty-financing-the-new-
thing-in-venture-capital. 
 136. Young startups are generally not eligible for venture debt or revenue-based loans. They are not eligible 
for venture debt because they are not yet mature enough to have pre-existing venture capital investors. And they 
are not eligible for revenue-based loans because they are largely pre-revenue companies. 
 137. Convertible notes existed prior to 2005. Coyle & Green (2014), supra note 6, at 161. However, the earlier 
versions were for classic bridge financings and were not specifically tailored for young-startup financings. Id. It 
was around 2005 that convertible notes were modified to resemble their current form and began to be used for 
standalone financings. Id. at 161–62; see also Bernthal, supra note 8, at 804. 
 138. Peter Werner, Primer on Convertible Debt, COOLEYGO, https://www.cooleygo.com/convertible-debt/ 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2020) [hereinafter Werner—Primer] (“Many early stage companies use convertible debt for 
their initial fundraising.”); 4 Benefits of Raising Funding via Convertible Notes, LEAPFUNDER (Aug. 5, 2015), 
https://www.leapfunder.com/blog/article/benefits-of-convertible-notes (“Convertible notes are financial 
products which have been at the heart of the start-up scene for years.”). 
 139. Peter Werner, Frequently Asked Questions: Convertible Debt, COOLEYGO
https://www.cooleygo.com/frequently-asked-questions-convertible-debt/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2020) [hereinafter 
Werner—FAQs]. 
 140. Werner—Primer, supra note 138. 
141. Id.
 142. Here is the automatic conversion provision from a form term sheet posted by Fenwick & West LLP: 
Conversion in Next Financing. Upon the Company’s next sale of its preferred stock in a single 
transaction or in a series of related transactions, in each case occurring on or before the Maturity Date, 
for an aggregate gross purchase price paid to the Company of no less than [One Million Dollars 
($1,000,000)] (excluding the principal amount of and accrued interest or any other amounts owing on 
all Notes converted in such sale) (the “Next Financing”), the entire balance then outstanding under 
each Note shall automatically be cancelled and converted into shares of the Company’s capital stock.  
Kristine M. Di Bacco & Doug Sharp, Convertible Note Financing Term Sheet (Seed-Stage Start-Up),
LEXISNEXIS 4 (2018), https://www.fenwick.com/FenwickDocuments/Convertible-Note-Financing-Term-
Sheet-Seed-Stage-Startup.pdf [hereinafter Sample Convertible Note Term Sheet]. 
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from a high-quality future stock offering.144 A simple example is helpful for illustrating 
the automatic conversion. 
Example: TechCo issued convertible notes to a group of angels. Here are the key terms: 
Principal amount: $500,000. 
Maturity: The notes mature in eighteen months (the “Maturity Date”) unless repaid 
or converted earlier. 
Interest rate: The notes carry an interest rate of five percent per year. Unpaid 
interest is added to the principal. 
Automatic conversion: If, prior to the Maturity Date, TechCo consummates a 
convertible preferred stock financing of at least $1 million, then the principal plus 
unpaid interest automatically converts into shares of the convertible preferred stock. 
Assume TechCo needs the money to cover manufacturing costs for its newly 
developed product. Without the $500,000, TechCo could not produce and sell its product, 
and would soon have to shut down. Obtaining the money provides TechCo with additional 
time and resources to prove it can be a successful venture. Convertible notes give young 
startups more runway to achieve important milestones, such as meaningful sales, that make 
priced equity rounds more feasible and attractive.145 To complete the example, assume 
TechCo conducted a qualified equity financing after twelve months. TechCo raised $3 
million in a Series A round at a $10 million pre-money valuation that translated into a $1 
price per share. After one year, the outstanding principal plus interest for the notes would 
be $525,000. Because TechCo consummated a qualified equity financing, the $525,000 
automatically converts into Series A convertible preferred stock. Note holders will receive 
525,000 shares (or $525,000/$1). 
2. Change of Control 
Another common scenario is for the startup to be bought before a qualified equity 
financing occurs. The notes should include a provision allowing for the note holders to 
benefit from a change of control transaction. For example, holders may have the option of 
(a) demanding immediate repayment plus a premium (e.g., 100 percent of the original 
principal balance) or (b) converting their notes to common stock at a pre-set conversion 
rate just before the change of control transaction is consummated.146
3. Notes Reach Maturity 
What if the notes mature without a conversion having occurred? Notes can address 
                                                        
prepayment could prevent them from converting the note in a financing, merger or asset sale.”). 
 144. Aaron Kellner, Convertible Note—Examples and How It Works, SEEDINVEST BLOG (Oct. 27, 2017), 
https://www.seedinvest.com/blog/startup-investing/how-convertible-notes-work; Meredith Turits, What Is a 
Convertible Note and Should Your Startup Issue Them for Financing?, FUNDERA (Oct. 3, 2018), 
https://www.fundera.com/blog/what-is-a-convertible-note; Scott Edward Walker, Everything You Ever Wanted 
to Know About Convertible Note Seed Financings (But Were Afraid to Ask), TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 7, 2012), 
https://techcrunch.com/2012/04/07/convertible-note-seed-financings/; see also Werner—Primer, supra note 
138. 
145. See Coyle & Green (2014), supra note 6, at 158–61. 
146. See Convertible Notes—Convertible Notes Primer, FUNDERSCLUB: EDUC. CTR.,
https://fundersclub.com/learn/convertible-notes/convertible-notes-overview/convertible-note-acquisition-
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this scenario in a few ways. Some notes may call for the issuer to repay immediately the 
principal and interest on the notes, while others give the note holders the option of 
demanding immediate repayment or converting the notes into equity at a pre-set 
conversion rate.147 Because few startups have the cash to repay the notes, and calling the 
notes could force the startup into bankruptcy and possible dissolution, noteholders 
commonly agree to extend the maturity date and give the startup more time to find equity 
investors.148 However, the threat of dissolution hangs over any convertible note deal. 
4. Discounts and Valuation Caps 
The above discussion left out two of the most hotly negotiated issues in most 
convertible note deals: the discount and the valuation cap. Note holders invest before the 
preferred stockholders, so they assume more risk. If the notes convert to preferred stock 
without any adjustment (as in the above TechCo example), they are not compensated for 
the additional risk.149 Note holders receive interest from the notes, but the interest rates 
are usually too low to compensate for the additional risk.150 Therefore, note holders 
usually insist on including a discount and a valuation cap in their notes. 
Discount. The discount grants note holders a price reduction when converting 
their debt to equity in the qualified equity financing.151 If the notes include a 
twenty percent discount and the qualified equity financing is priced at $1.00 
per share, the note holders convert their notes to stock at $0.80 per share. 
Discounts are commonly in the fifteen to twenty-five percent range.152
Valuation cap. The valuation cap limits the price at which the notes convert 
into equity. It sets a maximum value at which the convertible notes would 
convert, “regardless of the actual value agreed to by the issuer and the new 
equity investors.”153 If the valuation cap is $5 million, but the valuation from 
the qualified equity financing is higher than $5 million, the notes convert at the 
$5 million valuation.  
Issuers prefer convertible notes without a discount or valuation cap, but investors 
                                                        
 147. Werner—FAQs, supra note 139. Receiving the option is the superior alternative for investors because it 
prevents the startup from strategically delaying a financing or change of control transaction until after the 
maturity date. 
148. Id.
 149. Werner—Primer, supra note 138. 
150. See Hannah Bloomfield, The Basics of Convertible Notes: Convertible Note Terms, CAPSHARE BLOG
(July 13, 2018), https://www.capshare.com/blog/the-basics-of-convertible-notes-part-1-convertible-note-terms/ 
(“Convertible notes are a debt instrument and are legally required to carry interest. However, most of the time 
the interest will be set to zero or the lowest interest rate legally required. Convertible notes can carry higher 
interest rates, but it’s not the rule.”); see also Barry J. Kramer & Steven S. Levine, Seed Financing Survey 2012: 
Internet/Digital Media and Software Industries, FENWICK & WEST LLP (Mar. 25, 2013), 
https://www.fenwick.com/publications/Pages/Seed-Finance-Survey-2012.aspx [hereinafter 2012 Seed 
Financing Survey], which found median interest rates on convertible notes of 6.0 percent, 5.5 percent, and 5.5 
percent in 2010, 2011, and 2012, respectively. 
 151. Werner—Primer, supra note 138. 
 152. Id. This range assumes the notes also include a valuation cap. Discount rates are likely to be higher in 
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normally receive both protections.154 Usually, the discount or the valuation cap applies 
when converting the notes to equity, but not both.155 The note holders convert using 
whichever method proves more favorable. 
Example: Consider the above TechCo example, and assume the following additional facts: 
Discount: The notes will convert at a twenty percent discount to the pre-money 
valuation realized in the qualified equity financing. 
Valuation cap: The notes have a pre-money valuation cap of $6 million. 
Recall that TechCo conducted a qualified equity financing after twelve months, raising $3 
million in a Series A preferred stock round at a $10 million pre-money valuation that 
translated into a $1 price per share. The outstanding principal plus interest for the notes was 
$525,000. 
Discount calculation: The conversion formula calls for the notes to convert at a twenty 
percent discount. 
The $1 price per share must be reduced by the twenty percent discount (twenty 
percent of $1 is $0.20), or $1 – $0.20 = $0.80. The note holders’ price per share is 
$0.80. 
The note holders will receive 656,250 shares (or $525,000/$0.80). 
Valuation cap calculation: The valuation cap ($6 million) is lower than the actual valuation 
($10 million), so the note holders’ price per share must be adjusted.
Step 1: Divide the valuation cap ($6 million) by the actual valuation ($10 million), 
which equals sixty percent. 
Step 2: Multiply the preferred stock price ($1) by the Step 1 percentage (sixty 
percent), which results in an adjusted price per share of $0.60. 
The note holders will receive 875,000 shares (or $525,000/$0.60). 
In this case, the valuation cap calculation is more favorable for the note holders, so the notes 
would convert using the valuation cap. 
While convertible notes generally defer the need for a valuation analysis, discounts 
and valuation caps partially reintroduce it. As noted above, these provisions try to account 
for the note holders’ early-investment risk. Early forms of convertible notes mostly relied 
on discounts. However, the note holders were often disappointed with the discount rate 
when the startup proved very successful.156 Assume convertible note holders invested $1 
million in a young startup. The notes carried a five percent interest rate and included a 
twenty-five percent discount. But for the $1 million investment, the young startup would 
not have been able to complete its product development and would have been forced to 
shut down.  One year later, the startup conducted a Series A preferred stock round.  
It raised $25 million from a venture capital syndicate at a $50 million pre-
money valuation and a $5 price per share. The venture capital syndicate owns 
                                                        
154. Id.; see also 2012 Seed Financing Survey, supra note 150, which found the following for 2010–12. 
2010 2011 2012 
Percentage of deals that convert at a discount to the next 
equity round valuation 
67% 83% 90% 
Percentage of deals in which valuation on conversion is 
capped 
83% 82% 90% 
 155. Werner—Primer, supra note 138; Kellner, supra note 144. 
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5 million shares of Series A preferred stock, representing roughly 33.3 percent 
of the company. 
The startup did not make any principal or interest payments, so the outstanding 
principal plus interest for the notes was $1,050,000. 
The note holders receive 280,000 shares of Series A preferred stock (or 
$1,050,000/$3.75), which represents less than two percent of the company. 
The note holders are undoubtedly happy the startup succeeded, and their investment 
was positive. At the same time, they are probably disappointed that they own less than two 
percent of the startup despite their investment being a condition precedent to its success. 
This type of outcome led to valuation caps becoming a common feature for convertible 
debt.157 Consider the outcome if the note holders had obtained a pre-money valuation cap 
of $10 million. 
The notes’ conversion price would be $1 per share. This comes from dividing 
the valuation cap by the actual valuation ($10 million/$50 million or twenty 
percent) and multiplying the preferred stock share price ($5) by that percentage. 
The note holders would receive 1,050,000 shares of Series A preferred stock, 
which represents almost 7 percent of the company. 
The valuation cap involves a value judgment. The issuer wants to set the valuation 
cap at a high amount, while investors want a low amount. However, it does not appear that 
issuers or investors use formal valuation analyses (such as a DCF or a First Chicago 
method analysis) to inform this decision.158 Instead, the parties are more likely to use 
informal methods. The issuer wants to avoid the cap being so low that it deters future 
investors from buying into a qualified equity financing (because they feel the note holders 
are receiving too much).159 And the note holders want to protect themselves from 
receiving too little of the company if the qualified equity financing generates a favorable 
valuation.160 One solution is to run a number of scenarios that allow the issuer and the 
investors to see the potential outcomes as they try to reach an agreement (see Table 2).  
                                                        
157. Coyle & Green (2014), supra note 6, at 164. 
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Table 2 
Simplified Sample Valuation Cap Scenario Analysis 
Assumption:
Note holders purchased $1 million of convertible notes that do not accrue interest. 
Qualified Equity 
Financing Assumptions 
Note Holders’ % 
Ownership 
after the Qualified 
Equity Financing
Founders’ % Ownership




















$8 million $10 million $5 million 6.3% 7.7% 62.5% 61.5% 
$8 million $10 million $10 million 4.8% 5.9% 47.6% 47.1% 
$8 million $20 million $5 million 3.8% 9.1% 76.9% 72.7% 
$8 million $20 million $10 million 3.2% 7.7% 64.5% 61.5% 
$8 million $30 million $5 million 2.8% 9.7% 83.3% 77.4% 
$8 million $30 million $10 million 2.4% 8.6% 73.2% 68.6% 
$10 million $10 million $5 million 6.3% 6.3% 62.5% 62.5% 
$10 million $10 million $10 million 4.8% 4.8% 47.6% 47.6% 
$10 million $20 million $5 million 3.8% 7.4% 76.9% 74.1% 
$10 million $20 million $10 million 3.2% 6.3% 64.5% 62.5% 
$10 million $30 million $5 million 2.8% 7.9% 83.3% 78.9% 
$10 million $30 million $10 million 2.4% 7.0% 73.2% 69.8% 
$12 million $10 million $5 million 6.3% 6.3% 62.5% 62.5% 
$12 million $10 million $10 million 4.8% 4.8% 47.6% 47.6% 
$12 million $20 million $5 million 3.8% 6.3% 76.9% 75.0% 
$12 million $20 million $10 million 3.2% 5.3% 64.5% 63.2% 
$12 million $30 million $5 million 2.8% 6.7% 83.3% 80.0% 
$12 million $30 million $10 million 2.4% 5.9% 73.2% 70.6% 
For investors, the valuation cap analysis is much simpler than what is required for a 
priced equity transaction and can be accomplished without performance projections. 
Rather than determine the investment’s intrinsic value, investors can reasonably limit their 
analysis to determining how much they are willing to leave on the table if the investment 
proves to be very successful, which can be accomplished with tools like Table 2.  
5. Control Rights 
As noted earlier, venture capital firms use a sophisticated contract strategy involving 
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problems that plague startups.161 Receiving control rights is a focal point of that strategy. 
Venture capital firms commonly obtain substantial control over the startup by demanding 
board seats and special voting rights as part of their investment. Convertible notes 
generally do not provide their holders with such control rights. Board seats and class voting 
rights are not typically part of a convertible note deal.162 Moreover, note holders are not 
shareholders until the notes convert. Therefore, they do not receive fiduciary duty or other 
state shareholder protections until their notes convert.163
Convertible notes take a different approach to the control issue. Rather than directly 
grant their holders control rights, convertible notes push the startup to conduct a qualified 
equity financing with sophisticated investors. The note holders then piggyback on the 
rights given to the sophisticated investors. The notes’ maturity date establishes a firm date 
by which the startup must conduct a qualified equity financing, or risk possible 
bankruptcy, and the notes’ qualified equity financing definition ensures the subsequent 
investors are appropriately sophisticated and will insist on a proper level of controls and 
protections.  
B. Alternatives to Convertible Notes 
By 2010, convertible notes had become a crucial financial instrument for funding 
young-startups.164 However, the notes’ debt features were not viewed favorably by 
everyone.165 The maturity date is often the biggest problem. Convertible notes should only 
be used when the young startup and the potential note investors can confidently project 
conducting a Series A round soon. For young startups that need significant development 
before they are ready for a Series A round, convertible notes may not give them enough 
time. While maturity dates can be extended,166 the negotiations can take time and energy 
and generate significant legal fees.167 Keeping track of accrued interest payments can also 
be a nuisance168 and increase legal costs. Finally, convertible notes can trigger state 
lending regulations that limit flexibility169 and, once again, increase legal fees. To address 
these concerns, investors and their attorneys developed alternatives to convertible notes. 
                                                        
161. See supra notes 127–30 and accompanying text. 
 162. Walker, supra note 144; see 2012 Seed Financing Survey, supra note 150. The survey found: 
Board seats were granted in 72.5 percent, 70 percent, and 73 percent of preferred stock seed 
financings in 2010, 2011, and 2012, respectively. 
Board seats granted in 8.3 percent, 4 percent, and 0 percent of convertible note seed financings in 
2010, 2011, and 2012, respectively. Id.
 163. Bernthal, supra note 8, at 806. 
164. Paul Graham, the founder of Y Combinator announced in a 2010 tweet, “Convertible notes have won. 
Every investment so far in this YC batch (and there have been a lot) has been done on a convertible note. ”
Paul Graham (@paulg), TWITTER (Aug. 27, 2010, 7:29 PM), https://twitter.com/paulg/status/22319113993. 
While Y Combinator subsequently switched to safes as its investment instrument of choice, see infra Part III.B, 
many early investors have continued to use convertible notes and made them a mainstream funding instrument 
for young startups. 
 165. Coyle & Green (2014), supra note 6, at 165. 
 166. Werner—FAQs, supra note 139.
167. See Y COMBINATOR, SAFE USER GUIDE 4 (Sept. 2018), https://www.ycombinator.com/documents/ 
[hereinafter SAFE USER GUIDE] (scroll down the page and select the Safe User Guide link). 
 168. Coyle & Green (2014), supra note 6, at 166. 
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The developers’ goal was to preserve the note’s deferred-equity features while eliminating 
its repayment obligations. Safes and the KISS are two popular alternatives.170
1. Safes 
Carolyn Levy, a Y Combinator partner (and lawyer), is credited with inventing the 
first safe in 2013.171 Y Combinator launched the first accelerator program in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts during 2005172 and continues to be one of the most prestigious accelerators 
and seed investors. 
A safe is an investment contract that converts to stock if a triggering event, such as 
a qualified equity financing, occurs.173 Like convertible notes, safes allow investors to 
acquire stock in a future priced equity round while deferring valuation to that future round. 
And like convertible notes, safes routinely contain discounts and valuation caps.174
However, unlike convertible notes, safes are not debt and do not require repayment. Since 
there is no repayment obligation, safes generally give startups unlimited time before 
needing to accomplish a qualified equity financing.175 Thus, in addition to eliminating the 
administrative requirements that come with a debt instrument, safes do not put young 
startups on the clock for conducting a qualified equity financing. This expands the number 
of young startups that can use the instrument. 
a. Conversions 
Safes have comparable conversion mechanisms to those found in convertible notes 
with a qualified equity financing remaining the baseline conversion scenario. If the startup 
raises capital by selling preferred stock in a priced round, the safes automatically convert 
into preferred stock. However, safes generally do not include a minimum size threshold 
when defining a qualified equity financing.176 Any priced preferred stock round triggers 
an automatic conversion.  
Safes also typically include a liquidity event provision if the issuer is sold or 
conducts an IPO before a qualified equity financing occurs. The liquidity event provisions 
grant the safe holders the right to stock or cash in those circumstances.177 Finally, if the 
company liquidates before a conversion event, safe holders are given a claim on the 
                                                        
170. See generally Coyle & Green (2018), supra note 7, at 45–48; Bernthal, supra note 8, at 806–09. 
171. See supra note 10. 
 172. Ian Hathaway, What Startup Accelerators Really Do, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 1, 2016), 
https://hbr.org/2016/03/what-startup-accelerators-really-do. 
173. See SAFE USER GUIDE, supra note 167, 8–13. Y Combinator’s safe forms are available at 
https://www.ycombinator.com/documents/ [hereinafter Y Combinator’s Safe Forms]; see also SEC Investor 
Bulletin, supra note 14. 
 174. Coyle & Green (2018), supra note 7, at 46. 
175. SAFE USER GUIDE, supra note 167, at 4. But see Coyle & Green (2018), supra note 7, which conducted 
a survey of startup lawyers in the United States and Canada regarding the types of investment contracts they see 
in the early-stage startup finance space. The survey found that some startup lawyers “like to add a maturity date 
to the SAFE.” Id. at 58. 
 176. For example, Y Combinator’s version of the safe does not include a minimum size threshold when 
defining an “Equity Financing,” which is its version of a qualified equity financing. Y Combinator’s Safe Forms, 
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startup’s residual up to the amount they invested.178   
b. Discounts, Valuation Caps, and the Post-Money Safe 
Safes routinely include a discount and valuation cap. The argument for including 
discounts and valuation caps is even stronger for safes than for convertible notes since safe 
holders do not have the protection of a debt claim against the startup and may have to wait 
longer for a qualified equity financing. The valuation analysis for determining a safe’s 
discount and/or valuation cap should be comparable to that for a convertible note. 
Although if the safe carries more risk, a higher discount and/or lower valuation cap is 
justified.  
In 2018, Y Combinator introduced a post-money safe that alters investors’ valuation 
cap analysis somewhat.179 The original safes were pre-money safes.180 The valuation cap 
for pre-money safes, as well as most convertible notes, is based on the qualified equity 
financing’s pre-money valuation. Pre-money valuation is a company’s agreed valuation 
before an investment. Assume an investor buys stock representing twenty-five percent 
ownership in a company for $5 million. The company’s post-money valuation is $20 
million (or $5 million/twenty-five percent). However, its pre-money valuation is $15 
million, which is calculated as the post-money valuation minus the investment. 
A post-money valuation cap gives safe investors more certainty about their future 
ownership percentage and insulates them from dilution risk from future safe rounds and 
the size of the qualified equity financing.181 While the post-money versus pre-money safe 
                                                        
178. Id.
 179. See Carolyn Levy, Safe Financing Documents, Y COMBINATOR (Sept. 2018), 
https://www.ycombinator.com/documents/. 
180. Id.
181. Example: TechCo issued an original round of safes to an accelerator (the “Safe Investor”). The Safe 
Investor purchased $250,000 of safes that included a $5 million pre-money valuation cap. TechCo did not issue 
any further safe rounds and eventually conducted a qualified equity financing at a $10 million pre-money 
valuation. The Safe Investor’s ownership percentage in TechCo will be a function of how much money is raised 

































$10 million $5 million $15 million 5 million 10 million 0.5 500,000 3.2% 
$10 million $7.5 million $17.5 million 7.5 million 10 million 0.5 500,000 2.8% 
$10 million $10 million $20 million 10 million 10 million 0.5 500,000 2.4% 
If, however, the valuation cap is a post-money cap, the Safe Investor’s ownership percentage in TechCo will not 
change so long as the post-money valuation exceeds the cap. Assume the same facts as above except the safes 
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distinction is important for issuers and investors,182 it does not change a safe’s 
fundamental features. Both safe versions are deferred-equity instruments that derive their 
value from future stock issuances. Valuing the underlying preferred stock requires 
projecting the startup’s future operating performance and assessing the risk associated with 
that performance, and both safe forms allow the startup and its safe investors to defer that 
valuation to a future qualified equity financing. Finally, the analysis required to determine 
the valuation cap is comparable for the pre-money and post-money versions.  
What may be most important about the post-money safe is what it demonstrates 
about Specialized Startup Investors’ strength and sophistication. The post-money 
valuation feature is very pro-investor. It protects the safe investors from subsequent 
dilution and causes the founders (and other common stock holders) to absorb any dilution 
the Specialized Startup Investors avoid.183 Some Specialized Startup Investors felt they 
were not getting a good enough deal from their safe investments, so they modified the 
standard form to improve their deal at the expense of the issuers’ founders.  
c. Less Protections 
Safes generally offer holders less protections than convertible notes. Safes are not 
current equity shares, so the default rule is that they do not provide holders with voting 
rights. The parties can contractually grant the safe investors special control rights, such as 
board seats or class voting rights, but that does not appear to be the norm.184 Moreover, 
because safes are not debt and do not require repayment, they lack the inherent control 
associated with convertible notes. There is no maturity date to push the startup to conduct 
a qualified equity financing, nor is there the cudgel of potentially calling the notes to 
encourage the startup’s management team to take advice. This reduced control, when 
coupled with the fact young startups sell safes earlier in their life cycle than convertible 
notes, often justifies a higher discount and/or lower valuation cap.  
































$10 million $5 million $15 million 5 million 10 million 0.667 375,000 2.4% 
$10 million $7.5 million $17.5 million 7.5 million 10 million 0.571 437,000 2.4% 
$10 million $10 million $20 million 10 million 10 million 0.5 500,000 2.4% 
182. See, e.g., SAFE USER GUIDE, supra note 167, at 1–6 for a discussion of the advantages of the post-money 
safe; José Ancer, Why Startups Shouldn’t Use YC’s Post-Money SAFE, SILICON HILLS LAW. (May 1, 2019), 
https://siliconhillslawyer.com/2019/05/01/startups-shouldnt-use-yc-post-money-safe/, for an explanation of 
disadvantages the post-money safe presents to issuers. 
183. SAFE USER GUIDE, supra note 167, at 1–6; Ancer, supra note 182.
184. See, e.g., José Ancer, Pre-Series A Startup Boards, MEDIUM (May 17, 2017), 
https://austinstartups.com/pre-series-a-startup-boards-a309f1dd533f (“The majority of companies we see have 
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2. The KISS 
500 Startups, another prestigious startup accelerator, decided to establish its own 
deferred-equity instruments in 2014 to compete with convertible notes and safes. 500 
Startups’ instruments are called the KISS (the Keep It Simple Security). There are two 
versions of the KISS. There is a debt version, which includes a maturity date and interest 
rate,185 that is comparable to a convertible note.186 And there is an equity version187 that 
is like a safe.188 The two KISS versions raise the same valuation issues as convertible 
notes and safes. This article treats the debt version of the KISS as though it is functionally 
identical to a convertible note and the equity version of the KISS as though it is 
functionally identical to a safe.  
C. Valuation Deferral and Investor Cash Flows 
Deferred-equity instruments provide young startups and their investors with an 
important advantage. At a time when a reasonable valuation determination may not be 
possible, deferred equity allows the parties to defer valuation to a future funding round 
when the startup is more mature and easier to value. The ultimate investment goal remains 
the same: purchase future cash flows with a present value greater than the investment’s
purchase price. However, the process for identifying and measuring the future cash flows 
changes. Instead of projecting the startup’s future operating performance to run a DCF or 
other valuation analysis, investors focus on whether the startup will conduct a qualified 
equity financing. The cash flow and valuation progression can be broken down as follows: 
Qualified equity financing triggers an automatic conversion. If the 
qualified equity financing (or Series A round) occurs, the notes/safes convert 
to equity based on the Series A round valuation (as adjusted by the discount or 
valuation cap). The conversion does not generate immediate cash flows for the 
investor, but receiving the preferred stock makes future cash flows more 
probable. 
Future cash flows come from a future exit event. The future cash flows come 
from the startup achieving an IPO exit or acquisition exit, at which point the 
former note/safe holders (now preferred stockholders) can cash out their stock.  
Preferred stockholders value the future cash flows. When the prospective 
preferred stockholders value the startup for the Series A round, they value the 
future cash flows available to preferred stockholders at this later date when 
there is more information. The startup should have operating results by this 
point and there should be less uncertainty about its future. The stock price in 
the qualified equity financing should reflect the present value of the cash flows 
those shares project to receive. The note holders take the price set by the Series 
A round investors (as adjusted by the discount or valuation cap). 
                                                        
 185. Raiten, supra note 11.
 186. Giorgia Coltella, SAFE v. KISS, the Evolution of the Convertible Note, MEDIUM (Sept. 19, 2017), 
https://medium.com/centrally/safe-vs-kiss-the-evolution-of-the-convertible-note-4859d42a867d; Coyle & Green 
(2018), supra note 7, at 47. 
 187. Raiten, supra note 11. 
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Projecting whether a young startup will successfully conduct a qualified equity 
financing should be manageable for Specialized Startup Investors. It does not require 
generating detailed performance projections. It should only require identifying whether a 
young startup has the characteristics of successful startups that tend to attract venture 
capital investors in priced rounds and is only missing proven sales. This is not to suggest 
that predicting whether a young startup will conduct a future qualified equity financing is 
a trivial matter. However, it is a determination that Specialized Startup Investors should 
be able to make and is easier than developing highly uncertain valuation models for 
companies with no operating history. 
Deferred equity works in the traditional startup market because of the type of issuers 
and investors that populate the market. The instruments are designed to pay off if the 
startup raises institutional venture capital, so having a pool of venture-capital eligible 
issuers is a condition precedent to these instruments serving their function. Having high-
quality investors, such as venture capital firms, for the Series A is also a condition 
precedent. The note holders entrust the valuation function to those subsequent investors, 
so there must be a pool of investors who can thoughtfully value the startup once it reaches 
the Series A round. If the subsequent investors are not competent valuers, the model 
completely breaks down. Because the traditional startup market has both conditions 
precedent—venture-capital eligible issuers and high-quality Series A investors—the 
deferred-equity instruments allow risky, young startups to raise much needed capital 
without transferring an improper level of that risk to investors. 
IV. ARE DEFERRED-EQUITY INSTRUMENTS RIGHT FOR EVERYONE? CROWDFUNDING AND 
DEFERRED-EQUITY
Improving capital access for young startups is a critical matter for policymakers, and 
deferred-equity instruments have been a positive addition to the classic seed investing 
market. But are they right for everyone?  
So far, this article has discussed deferred-equity instruments as financial instruments 
and contracts. However, they also qualify as securities.189 As a result, when issuers offer 
and sell deferred-equity instruments to investors, they must comply with federal and state 
securities laws. Historically, companies have had two paths for selling their securities.  
Path 1—heavily regulated public offering. Companies can sell securities to 
the public (accessing its immense capital resources) but must first register the 
                                                        
 189. It is reasonable to assume that all (or essentially all) safes and convertible notes qualify as securities under 
federal and state law. Safes should qualify as “investment contracts,” which are defined as securities under federal 
and state law. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (federal definition); and see section 401(m) of the Uniform Securities Act 
of 1956 for an example of the state definition. An instrument is an investment contract where there is an (1) 
investment of money; (2) in a common enterprise; (3) with an expectation of profits; and (4) those profits are to 
come solely from the efforts of others. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946). Convertible notes 
should also qualify as investment contracts. Moreover, the convertible notes are “notes,” which are defined as 
securities under federal and state law. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (federal definition); and see section 401(m) of the 
Uniform Securities Act of 1956 for an example of the state definition. UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 401(m) (1956).
There are several categories of notes that are not securities, Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 64–68 (1990), 
but convertible notes do not fit within any of those categories nor do they have a resemblance to any of the non-
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transaction190 and submit to substantial SEC oversight. While costly, heavy 
regulation helps reduce the public’s exposure to fraud and improper risk.
Path 2—lightly regulated private offering. Companies can sell securities in 
cheaper private offerings. Since the public faces less exposure, less regulation 
is needed. However, the companies’ access to capital is limited. The most 
common limitation is to restrict companies to selling to sophisticated investors 
who do not need the protections afforded by registration.191 When Specialized 
Startup Investors purchase classic deferred-equity instruments, those are Path 
2 transactions.  
Regulation CF provides issuers with an additional option. Issuers can raise up to 
$1,070,000 from the public in a twelve-month period192 in a transaction that is regulated 
less heavily than a registered offering, but more heavily than a private offering. A 
Regulation CF transaction must be conducted exclusively through a broker or registered 
funding portal,193 and the amount sold to any individual investor is subject to purchase 
limitations of $2,200 to $107,000 based on the investor’s annual income and net worth.194
Issuers and funding portals (or brokers) must satisfy several investor safeguards, such as 
providing investors, and potential investors, with detailed disclosure at the time of the 
offering and on an annual basis thereafter.195
It was not long after Regulation CF took effect that crowdfunding issuers began 
using deferred-equity instruments to raise capital from public investors.196 In fact, 
Republic and Wefunder both have their own safe templates.197 Joseph Green and John 
Coyle investigated the practice of crowdfunded safes and wrote a December 2016 essay, 
Crowdfunding and the Not-so-SAFE SAFE.198 The authors had two main concerns. First, 
safes are designed for issuers that are expected to conduct priced venture capital rounds in 
the near future. However, the authors believed “exceedingly few of the crowdfunding 
companies would actually be able to do so.”199 This skepticism came from two factors. 
Venture capital firms favor technology companies with high-growth trajectories.200 Many 
of the crowdfunding issuers were “[n]on-tech startups with business models that are less 
                                                        
 190. 15 U.S.C. § 77e. To register a transaction, the issuer must file a registration statement with the SEC. 
Registration statements provide detailed information about the issuer and the offering. 
191. See, e.g., Securities Act section 4(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2), and Rule 506(b) and (c) of Regulation D, 
17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b) and (c). 
 192. 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(1). 
 193. Historically, securities intermediaries must generally register as brokers. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4). The JOBS 
Act, through Securities Act section 4(a)(6)(C), introduced a new category of registered securities intermediary, 
a “funding portal,” for section 4(a)(6) crowdfunding transactions. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(C). Regulation CF Rule 
100(a)(3) implements section 4(a)(6)(C)’s funding portal provision. 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(3). 
 194. 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(2). 
 195. 17 C.F.R. §§ 227.201–03. 
 196. Green & Coyle (2016), supra note 13, at 169, 177–80; SEC Investor Bulletin, supra note 14. 
 197. The Crowd SAFE, REPUBLIC, https://republic.co/crowdsafe (last visited Mar. 8, 2020); Simple Agreement 
for Future Equity (SAFE), WEFUNDER, https://wefunder.com/faq/securities#SAFE (last visited Mar. 8, 2020). 
 198. See Green & Coyle (2016), supra note 13. 
 199. Joe Green, Commentary: SEC Rightly Concerned about ‘So-called SAFE’ Securities in Crowdfunding,
REUTERS (June 1, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/bc-finreg-crowdfunding-safe-idUSKBN18S63M. 
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likely to attract VC investment.”201 For the issuers that were technology startups and had 
“business models which, at first blush, would appear attractive to VC investors,”202 the 
authors believed they suffered from an adverse selection problem. Due to the higher costs 
and additional disclosure requirements for Regulation CF offerings, high-growth 
technology startups should prefer raising capital from Specialized Startup Investors in the 
traditional startup market. These issuers only turn to Regulation CF offerings “because 
they have no other options, and they may still struggle to raise traditional venture financing 
down the road.”203 In addition to their issuer concerns, Green and Coyle were also 
concerned that the safes contained “terms that are likely to frustrate the ability of investors 
to share in the upside of successful crowdfunding companies.”204 A few months after the 
Green and Coyle essay, the SEC issued an investor bulletin urging issuers to be “[c]autious 
of SAFES in [c]rowdfunding.”205
Despite these concerns, crowdfunding issuers have continued to issue deferred-
equity instruments unabated. Is that good or bad? On one hand, valuation deferral could 
benefit any young startup and its investors regardless of the forum used to raise the capital. 
On the other hand, using deferred-equity instruments in the crowdfunding setting may be 
improper due to the types of issuers conducting crowdfunding offerings and the investors’ 
sophistication level. Regulation CF deferred-equity offerings could expose 
unsophisticated investors to an inappropriate level of risk. To get a clearer picture of the 
issue, this author examined all the Regulation CF deals funded through the Republic, 
StartEngine, and Wefunder portals during 2019. These three funding portals were chosen 
because they are three of the most popular portals and because Republic and Wefunder 
have developed their own forms of deferred-equity interests and are therefore closely 
associated with deferred-equity.  
The Study captured 205 funded deals, of which seventy-one were safe offerings and 
twenty-two were convertible note offerings (see Table 5). The ninety-three deferred-equity 
deals totaled $30.6 million, with an average deal size of $331,891 and a median deal size 
of $200,240.206
                                                        
201. Id. 
202. Id. at 175. 
203. Id.
204. Id. at 169. 
 205. SEC Investor Bulletin, supra note 14. 
 206. One caveat about the data collection: The funding amounts for some of the Wefunder deals may be 
exaggerated. Each of the portals provides a list of funded companies, how much each issuer raised, and how 
many investors it attracted. However, when Wefunder lists this information, it appears to aggregate all the deals 
the issuer has ever done on Wefunder. As a result, some of the 2019 Wefunder deals in the Study may have 
exaggerated dollar amounts. This author tried to clear up the problem by reviewing each issuer’s Form C-U. Per 
Regulation CF Rule 203(a)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 227.203(a)(3), each issuer must file a Form C-U disclosing the total 
amount of securities sold in the offering within five business days after the offering deadline. However, few of 
the Wefunder issuers that completed a Regulation CF offering during the Study filed their Form C-U. This author 
believes the exaggerated numbers only affected a small number of the Wefunder deals and does not materially 
affect the overall numbers. For a few of the Wefunder deals, the reported funding amount exceeded the maximum 
offering size stated on the issuer’s Form C. In those cases, the Study replaced the reported funding amount with 
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Table 5 
Summary of Deals Funded During 2019 
Republic StartEngine Wefunder 
Safes 
Number of deals 36 — 35
Total funding amount $13,227,829 — $11,911,098 
Average $367,440 — $340,317 
Median $171,742 — $229,573 
Convertible notes 
Number of deals — 7 15
Total funding amount — $510,730 $4,982,722 
Average — $72,961 $332,181 
Median — $74,980 $288,547 
Equity (common or 
preferred) 
Number of deals — 68 23
Total funding amount — $19,562,265 $10,065,548 
Average — $287,680 $437,633 
Median — $59,399 $279,787 
Other 
Number of deals 4 6 11
Total funding amount $496,740 $1,098,465 $2,326,872 
Average $124,185 $183,078 $211,534 
Median $147,124 $103,369 $170,726 
The Study examined the deferred-equity issuers and the terms of their instruments. 
Based on that review, this author concludes that most of the deferred-equity offerings in 
the Study are very risky investments that do not appear to offer investors enough upside 
potential to offset the risk. More specifically, this author concludes:  
Most of the issuers appear unlikely ever to raise money from venture capital 
firms. 
The instruments’ terms are very issuer friendly. The instruments are far more 
favorable to issuers than one would expect for such high-risk investments.  
The issuer-friendly terms raise concerns that Regulation CF investors lack the 
sophistication to understand and internalize the risks and terms of their 
investments. 
A. The Issuers 
The Study lends support to Green’s and Coyle’s concern about crowdfunding 
issuers’ ability to conduct future, priced venture capital rounds. Venture capital firms 
generally invest in technology startups with business models that address large market 
opportunities and suggest a rapid-growth future.207 First, many of the ninety-three 
                                                        
 207. Venture capital firms want companies with a potential to be worth hundreds of millions of dollars, or 
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deferred-equity issuers were not technology companies. Roughly one-quarter of the issuers 
were in the food industry (including healthy cookie companies, specialty beer or spirit 
producers, catering companies, and grocery delivery companies), apparel and beauty 
industry, or other similar nontechnology sectors. Green and Coyle explained that 
nontechnology companies “are less likely to be candidates for VC investment and more 
likely to evolve into either lifestyle businesses for the founders . . . or companies that rely 
on debt financing (such as bank loans) and reinvested profits to support additional 
growth.”208 Even among the technology issuers, many appear to lack venture capital-style 
business plans or growth potential. For example, there are issuers providing outsourced 
3D printing services, foreign-language teaching services, and several niche eCommerce 
websites and phone apps. Predicting whether venture capital firms will invest in a 
particular issuer is an admittedly subjective call. However, many of the issuers simply do 
not appear to be venture capital-style companies.  
Green and Coyle were concerned that even those issuers that arguably have business 
models and growth trajectories that may interest venture capital firms will suffer from an 
adverse selection problem if they conduct a Regulation CF deferred-equity offering.209
Regulation CF is a funding option of last resort for such technology companies, meaning 
the offering signals to future venture capital investors that these issuers are not strong 
companies worthy of investment.210 A recent study focused on the German venture capital 
market explains, “there is strong indication that venture investors perceive crowd money 
as a negative signal for a start-up’s overall quality and therefore have a lower preference 
for selecting such-funded firms for further due diligence.”211 Raising a Regulation CF 
round could discourage venture capital firms from even considering such issuers for future 
funding rounds. 
The Study could not directly measure the presence of an adverse selection problem, 
but it could consider the issuers’ financial results to see if they shed some light on whether 
the companies are likely to be attractive venture capital candidates in the future. Of the 
ninety-three deferred-equity issuers, most lacked substantial revenues and were 
unprofitable (see Tables 6 and 7). The lack of revenues and profits should not be 
surprising. Deferred-equity instruments are intended for young startups that, by definition, 
lack meaningful operating histories. What is somewhat surprising is the number of issuers 
with revenue above $500,000 (or even $1 million), as well as the number of issuers that 
generated profits in their most recent fiscal years. There were eighteen different issuers 
that either generated more than $500,000 of revenues or $50,000 of net income during 
their most recently completed fiscal year. While having a meaningful operating history is 
normally a positive factor, it may not be in the deferred-equity setting. Deferred equity 
allows issuers and their investors to defer valuation because such companies lack the 
meaningful operating histories required for traditional valuation analysis. Once a company 
                                                        
opportunities for the startup. 
 208. Green & Coyle (2016), supra note 13, at 175–76. 
209. Id. at 175. 
210. See generally Michael Maximilian Mödl, Is Wisdom of the Crowd a Positive Signal? Effects of 
Crowdfinancing on Subsequent Venture Capital Selection, MAX PLANCK INSTIT. FOR INNOVATION &
COMPETITION 10–12, 25–29 (Aug. 1, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3222461. 
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has a meaningful operating history, a traditional valuation analysis should generally be 
possible, thus raising questions about why some of these issuers chose to use deferred-
equity interests for their funding event. 
Table 6 







All issuers 93 $407,648 $30,940 
Issuer with no revenues 32 $0 $0
Issuers with revenues above $0 and up 
to $250,000 
38 $79,599 $51,186 
Issuers with revenues above $250,000 
and up to $500,000 
8 $379,625 $374,540 
Issuers with revenues above $500,000 
and up to $1 million 
4 $690,850 $688,841 
Issuers with revenues above $1 million 11 $2,638,011 $1,920,425 
Table 7 







All issuers 93 ($367,286) ($76,232) 
Issuers without net income 81 ($444,518) ($143,501) 
Issuers with net income  12 $89,511 $15,205 
The most surprising financial data was the issuers’ debt levels. Startups seeking to 
raise their first formal venture capital round are normally not burdened by significant 
debt.212 This makes intuitive sense because the venture capital firms want their investment 
dollars to fund growth, not repay creditors. The issuers in the Study, however, exhibited 
significant debt levels (see Table 8). Twenty-six of the issuers, or thirty percent, had 
combined short-term and long-term debt exceeding $500,000 in their most recent fiscal 
year. Having substantial debt would not be troubling if the issuer also had substantial assets 
to offset the debt. This was generally not the case for the issuers in the Study. Over sixty 
percent of the issuers with debt above $500,000 had debt obligations that were at least 
twice the amount of their total assets, and seven of those issuers had debt obligations that 
were at least ten-times the amount of their total assets. It is difficult to imagine venture 
capital firms investing in companies with that type of debt profile. 
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Table 8 







Median Debt Number 
of Issuers 
with Debt 





















debt from $0 
to $250,000 




















14 $2,561,977 $1,787,197 9 4
Another indication that many of the issuers will likely struggle to conduct a future 
venture round is their prior capital raising history. Two-thirds of the issuers in the Study 
had raised at least one convertible note and/or safe round in the three years preceding their 
Regulation CF offering (see Table 9). And many of those prior rounds were significant. 
The bigger the prior offerings, the more claims on the startup’s equity if a future venture 
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because they mean the venture capital firm has to share the company’s future cash flows 
with more parties. Prior convertible offerings also create more complex ownership 
structures for a venture capital firm to sift through, which is not an attractive feature. 
Finally, most of the prior convertible offerings were for larger sums than the 2019 
Regulation CF offering. This does not paint a picture of thriving companies that are 
ascending the capital-raising food chain to attract more money from deeper pockets. 
Rather, it paints a picture of issuers that are becoming less popular and having to settle for 
capital wherever they can find it, which does not bode well for future venture capital 
rounds.  
Table 9 
Deferred-equity issuers with prior convertible note or safe offerings in the three 










Number of Issuers 
raising less from 
current Reg CF 




All issuers that 
conducted a prior 
deferred-equity offering 
61 $843,585 $360,000 31
Issuers that raised up to 
$500,000 in prior 
deferred-equity 
offerings 
35 $180,272 $175,000 10
Issuers that raised 
above $500,000 and up 
to $1 million in prior 
deferred-equity 
offerings 
9 $715,974 $684,000 5
Issuers that raised 
above $1 million in 
prior deferred-equity 
offerings 
17 $2,276,787 $1,699,029 16
B. The Instruments’ Terms
The Study also examined the terms of the deferred-equity instruments issued in the 
ninety-three Regulation CF offerings.  
1. Safes  
The seventy-one safe deals were split roughly evenly between the Wefunder and 
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Wefunder has the “Wefunder SAFE” and Republic has the “Crowd SAFE.” Both 
templates are based on the Y Combinator safe. A standard Y Combinator safe converts in 
two main instances:  
(1) Equity financing. If the issuer raises capital by selling preferred stock in a 
priced round (with no minimum size threshold), the safe automatically converts 
to a shadow stock that is identical to the issued preferred stock with a few 
exceptions (such as the liquidation preference).213
(2) Liquidity event. If the issuer sells itself or conducts an IPO (a “liquidity event”) 
before a preferred stock round occurs, the safe holders automatically receive the 
greater of (a) the purchase price originally paid for the safes or (b) a cash amount 
based on converting the safes into common stock immediately before the 
liquidity event at the defined conversion ratio. The safe holders may also have 
the choice to receive their consideration in stock.
The Y Combinator safe does have a loophole that issuers could exploit, which this 
article refers to as the “Common Stock Loophole.” The equity financing conversion is only 
triggered by a future preferred stock round, not by a common stock round. Issuers could 
theoretically use the Common Stock Loophole to avoid conversion until a liquidity event 
by only doing common stock rounds. However, such an outcome is unlikely in the 
traditional startup market because priced venture capital rounds almost always involve 
preferred stock. Exploiting the loophole would require finding venture capital investors 
willing to take common stock, which is doubtful. Moreover, exploiting the loophole 
violates the spirit of the safe agreement, which would hurt the issuer’s (and its managers’) 
reputation. Traditional startups operate in a “clubby” world214 where reputations are 
important to obtaining funding. Young startups that raise capital from Specialized Startup 
Investors are the types of companies that can also tap the formal venture capital market for 
their Series A round. Such issuers are unlikely to risk their reputation, and foreclose their 
venture capital access, to exploit the Common Stock Loophole.  
The Wefunder SAFE and the Crowd SAFE mostly copy the Y Combinator safe’s 
                                                        
 213. If the valuation cap is significantly below the subsequent equity financing’s valuation, the safe holders 
would receive a liquidation preference that far exceeds what they invested in the company. 
Example: Assume TechCo sold $200,000 of safes to an accelerator (the “Safe Investor”). The safes 
include a $5 million post-money valuation cap. TechCo subsequently sells preferred stock in a 
qualified equity financing. The qualified equity financing has a $10 million post-money valuation that 
translates into a $1 price per share. This means the Safe Investor’s safes will convert into 400,000 
shares of preferred stock. 
The safes’ conversion price is $0.50 per share, which comes from dividing the valuation cap 
by the actual valuation ($5 million/$10 million) and multiplying the preferred stock price ($1) 
by that percentage. 
The Safe Investor’s $200,000 investment multiplied by $0.50 per share equates to 400,000 
shares. 
The preferred stock from the qualified equity financing includes a liquidation preference. Each share 
of preferred stock has a $1 liquidation preference. If TechCo liquidates, the preferred stockholders 
get their investment back before common stockholders receive anything. If the Safe Investor receives 
400,000 shares of preferred stock, it receives a $400,000 liquidation preference despite investing only 
$200,000. 
This excess liquidation preference would be a windfall for the safe holders, so the shadow stock often limits the 
liquidation preference to the safe holders’ investment amount. 
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conversion approach. Each has conversion provisions for equity financings and liquidity 
events that are similar to the Y Combinator safe. However, the Wefunder SAFE and the 
Crowd SAFE do have some features that warrant discussion. 
a. Wefunder SAFE  
i. Basic Conversion Feature 
With a few exceptions, the Wefunder SAFEs in the Study had identical conversion 
features. Because the Wefunder SAFE is modeled after the Y Combinator safe, it converts 
upon the occurrence of an “Equity Financing” or a “Liquidity Event.” An “‘Equity 
Financing’ means a bona fide transaction or series of transactions with the principal 
purpose of raising capital, pursuant to which the Company issues and sells Preferred Stock 
at a fixed pre-money valuation.”215 Like the Y Combinator safe, the Wefunder SAFE 
includes the Common Stock Loophole. While traditional startups are unlikely to exploit 
the loophole, the same may not be true for Regulation CF issuers. It is unclear who 
Regulation CF issuers will turn to for their future equity financing rounds. As explained 
earlier, venture capital firms may not be interested in these issuers. If Regulation CF 
issuers continue to seek capital through Regulation CF offerings, such investors may be 
comfortable taking common stock over preferred stock.  
If the issuer does sell preferred stock in a priced round, Wefunder SAFEs 
automatically convert, although Wefunder SAFEs convert into nonvoting preferred stock. 
Like a Y Combinator safe, there is no minimum size threshold for the preferred stock 
offering to trigger conversion. 
ii. Exceptions 
A few issuers modified the Wefunder SAFE’s basic conversion feature. Three 
issuers’ safes called for an automatic conversion if an Equity Financing occurs. However, 
these issuers eliminated the definition for an Equity Financing, making it unclear exactly 
what triggers the Equity Financing conversion.216 It is not clear whether eliminating the 
“Equity Financing” definition was a conscious decision by the issuer or a mere editing 
error. 
Additionally, one issuer completely eliminated the Equity Conversion feature, 
meaning its safes only convert for a Liquidity Event.217 A “Liquidity Event” is defined as 
                                                        
 215. WEFUNDER, WEFUNDER SAFE FOR CORPORATIONS – VALUATION CAP & DISCOUNT4,
https://wefunder.com/faq/legal-primer (last visted Feb. 22, 2020) [hereinafter WEFUNDER SAMPLE SAFE] (scroll 
down the Legal Primer for Founders page to the Wefunder SAFE: Simple Agreement for Future Equity section 
and select the Wefunder SAFE for Corporations - Valuation Cap & Discount document under the Sample 
Agreements subheading). 
216. See APP APP, INC., OFFERING STATEMENT (FORM C) (May 13, 2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1776303/000167025419000344/documents_list.htm; DOWNTODASH,
INC., OFFERING STATEMENT (FORM C) (July 16, 2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1781213/000167025419000406/documents_list.htm; STEALTH 
MACHINE CO., OFFERING STATEMENT (FORM C) (May 28, 2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1777610/000167025419000363/documents_list.htm. 
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a change of control transaction or an IPO.218 This is a significant change from the standard 
template and the issuer did not explain the reasoning behind it.  
iii. Repurchase Provision to Prevent Section 12(g) Registration 
The default Wefunder SAFE does have a unique feature not present in the Y 
Combinator safe.219 The Wefunder SAFE gives the issuer a right to repurchase the safe to 
prevent registration under section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 
“Exchange Act”).220 If the issuer determines, in its sole discretion, that its securities are 
likely to be held by enough record holders to require registration under section 12(g), the 
issuer can repurchase a safe for the greater of (a) the purchase price or (b) the fair market 
value of the safe as determined by an independent appraiser chosen by the issuer. However, 
if an equity financing occurs within three months after a safe repurchase and the equity 
financing would have generated a better price for the safe holder, the issuer must pay the 
difference to the former safe holder.  
Exchange Act section 12(g)(1)221 requires issuers with a class of equity securities to 
register them under the Exchange Act and become a reporting company if two conditions 
are met: 
(1) The issuer has more than $10 million in total assets; and 
(2) The issuer has a class of equity securities with either (a) more than 2,000 
shareholders of record222 or (b) 500 or more shareholders of record who are not 
accredited investors. 
Becoming a reporting company is extremely expensive, and few companies want to 
do so until conducting their IPO. The JOBS Act made it easier to avoid section 12(g) 
registration by adding a new paragraph (6) to section 12(g)223 that instructs the SEC to 
exempt section 4(a)(6) securities from section 12(g)’s provisions. The SEC implemented 
its section 12(g)(6) mandate with Exchange Act Rule 12g-6,224 which provides that 
securities issued in a section 4(a)(6) offering are not included in the section 12(g)(1) record 
                                                        
 218. WEFUNDER SAMPLE SAFE, supra note 215, at 4. 
219. Id.
 220. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g). 
 221. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1). 
 222. Section 12(g)(1) focuses on “shareholders of record” rather than “beneficial owners.” The beneficial 
owner is the investor who purchased the security, and the person one typically thinks of as the real owner of the 
security. The shareholder of record, in contrast, is the party in whose name the securities are held on the books 
of the issuer or its transfer agent. For example, when an investor buys securities through a brokerage firm, most 
brokerage firms will hold those securities in street name. Holding Your Securities: Get the Facts, SEC (Mar. 3,
2003), http://sec.gov/investor/pubs/holdsec.htm. This means the brokerage firm will hold the securities in its 
name, and not in the name of the investor. Id. Thus, the investor is the beneficial owner of the securities, and the 
brokerage firm is the shareholder of record. 
 223. See 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(6) (internal citations omitted).  
Sec. 12. Registration Requirements for Securities. 
(g) . . . 
(6)Exclusion for persons holding certain securities.—The Commission shall, by rule, exempt, 
conditionally or unconditionally, securities acquired pursuant to an offering made under section 
4[(a)](6) of the Securities Act of 1933 from the provisions of this subsection. 
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holder count if the issuer: (1) is current in filing its Regulation CF annual reports,225 (2) 
has total assets not exceeding $25 million; and (3) has engaged an SEC-registered transfer 
agent. The rule also includes a two-year transition period for issuers that subsequently 
exceed the $25 million total asset threshold.  
Because of Rule 12g-6, it is not clear that Regulation CF issuers truly need the 
repurchase provision. Since issuers have sole discretion to decide when the provision is 
triggered, there is potential for abusing the right. The same holds true for the issuer’s right 
to choose the appraiser and only giving safe holders a three-month price guarantee. 
b. Crowd SAFE 
i. Basic Conversion Feature 
Each of the Crowd SAFEs in the Study had identical conversion features with two 
exceptions that are mentioned below. Like Wefunder SAFEs, Crowdfunder SAFEs 
convert into nonvoting stock if an “Equity Financing” or “Liquidity Event” occurs. 
However, unlike Wefunder SAFEs or Y Combinator safes, Crowd SAFEs include a $1 
million minimum size threshold to trigger an equity financing conversion.226 Considering 
the average size of the 2019 Republic safe offerings was only $367,447 and only eight of 
the thirty-six Crowd SAFE issuers raised more than $500,000 in their offerings, the $1 
million threshold could be a significant barrier to conversion. Moreover, one of the issuers 
increased the threshold to $3 million227 and another issuer increased the threshold to $15 
million.228
The Crowd SAFE appears to eliminate the Common Stock Loophole, but the 
instrument’s language does leave some ambiguity. An equity financing conversion is 
triggered if the issuer conducts an “Equity Securities” sale that raises at least $1 million. 
Equity Securities are defined as common or preferred stock, which would appear to 
eliminate the loophole. However, when a Crowd SAFE does convert, it converts into “CF 
Shadow Series” shares. CF Shadow Series shares are defined as “Preferred Stock that is 
identical in all respects to the shares of Preferred Stock issued in the relevant Equity 
Financing.” The CF Shadow Series definition suggests that only a preferred stock deal 
would trigger the safe, since safes appear to only convert into preferred stock.  
The most distinct Crowd SAFE feature is its “roll-over” feature. If a Crowd SAFE 
issuer conducts a qualifying equity financing, it has the option, at its sole discretion, to 
immediately convert the safes into stock or postpone the conversion to a later equity 
financing (where conversion can be postponed again) or a liquidity event. If a liquidity 
event occurs, the safes must be converted. Subsequent conversions are done based on the 
stock price from the first equity financing. Republic explains that the purpose of the roll-
                                                        
 225. An issuer that has sold securities in a Regulation CF offering must file an annual report on Form C-AR 
no later than 120 days after the end of the fiscal year covered by the report. 17 C.F.R. § 227.203(b). 
 226. See The Crowd Safe, REPUBLIC, https://republic.co/crowdsafe (last visited Feb. 6, 2020) (scroll down the 
page for the links to the Crowd SAFE example templates). 
 227. TWO SPIRIT LLC, OFFERING STATEMENT (FORM C/A) (Dec. 3, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1754776/000175477618000004/thephluidproject_formca.pdf. 
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over provision is to allow issuers a clean cap table. 
 The Crowd SAFE allows all investors in your Republic campaign to be represented as 
one line item on your cap table. It helps startups fundraising under Reg CF avoid “messy cap 
table” concerns, save legal fees, and reduce the time spent structuring the terms of their 
financing. 
 With the Crowd SAFE, investors only convert at a liquidity event––an acquisition, IPO, 
or change of control. Unlike a traditional SAFE, they don’t automatically convert at 
subsequent equity financing. This ensures investors are never on the cap table as individuals. 
(That is, unless you’d like them to be––we can make that work, too.)229
c. Problems with Conversion Avoidance 
The Wefunder SAFE (due to the Common Stock Loophole) and the Crowd SAFE 
(due to the minimum-size threshold, the roll-over feature, and possibly the Common Stock 
Loophole) allow issuers to avoid conversion. Is that a problem? At first glance, the answer 
may seem to be no. In the traditional startup market, few startups pay dividends. That 
means investors only receive cash flows when the startup achieves a liquidity event (sale 
of the company or IPO), at which point the investors can sell their stock for cash. Since 
conversion avoidance is not possible when a liquidity event occurs, investors do not appear 
to be harmed.  
However, in their 2016 essay, Green and Coyle envision a scenario where safe 
investors could be harmed by conversion avoidance. 
Imagine a . . . company that raises capital in a crowdfunding offering using a SAFE. The 
company uses that capital to launch a product or service, which starts generating significant 
cash flow before the company needs additional capital. The company is able to use that cash 
flow to obtain bank financing and may even have profits to reinvest in growing the business. 
At some point, that company may also have sufficiently healthy profits to start distributing 
those profits to its owners (the founders). This business, following a path that is extremely 
common—perhaps the norm—for non-tech startups and small businesses, could continue in 
this fashion in perpetuity without ever needing additional equity capital or needing to sell. If 
that were to happen, the SAFE holders would continue to hold their securities, earning no 
interest, receiving no dividends and never seeing any return of their original investment. We 
call this the “dividend problem.”230
This article posits another harmful dividend scenario. The issuer could avoid 
conversion until reaching a liquidity event—most likely a sale of the company. Shortly 
before the sale is consummated and conversion takes place, the issuer could declare a 
dividend and distribute a portion of its residual to its existing shareholder base.231 The safe 
investors would not be entitled to that dividend, since they are not shareholders. Moreover, 
the issuer board’s ability to declare the dividend would not be blocked by fiduciary duty 
concerns since, once again, the safe holders are not shareholders. A pre-sale dividend could 
possibly violate the issuer’s implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.232 However, 
                                                        
 229. The Crowd Safe: Clean Cap Table, REPUBLIC, https://republic.co/crowdsafe (last visited Feb. 22, 2020). 
 230. Green & Coyle (2016), supra note 13, at 177–78. 
 231. The dividend would make the issuer a less attractive acquisition candidate, since it would have fewer 
assets, but that could be addressed by lowering the acquisition price to match the dividend payment.  
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the duty of good faith and fair dealing is not well defined and would require a court to 
analyze the specific facts and circumstances of the dividend. Clearly prohibiting pre-sale 
dividends would be a better approach for safe investors.  
d. Discounts and Valuation Caps 
The Study also raised concerns about the discounts and valuation caps employed by 
issuers. Wefunder SAFEs and Crowd SAFEs generally included both features, with 
investors using whichever is more favorable for them.233 Recall that discounts and 
valuation caps are meant to compensate investors for the additional risk they incur by 
investing before the priced round. The discount and/or valuation cap is the risk premium 
the issuer must pay to raise earlier-stage dollars. Riskier issuers—which includes issuers 
that are less likely to conduct a future qualified offering—should pay higher discounts and 
have lower valuation caps. However, the Study found that the discounts on the safe deals 
were generally low to nonexistent while the valuation caps were frequently very high (see 
Table 10). Discounts ranged from zero percent (in nineteen of the seventy-one deals) to 
thirty percent (in one deal) with an average discount rate of 13.1 percent. Regarding the 
valuation caps, fourteen of the deals had either no cap or a cap of $20 million or more. The 
highest valuation cap was $70 million, and the average cap was $11.6 million.  
Table 10 
Discounts and valuation caps for the safe issuers234
Discount Rate Number of 
Issuers
Valuation Caps Number 
of Issuers 
No discount 19 No valuation cap 4
10% 10 $40 million and above 3
12% 1 $20 million to below $40 million 7
15% 4 $10 million to below $20 million 15
20% 32 $5 million to below $10 million 35
22% 1 Below $5 million 7
25% 2 Average valuation cap was $11.6 million 
30% 1
Average discount was 13.1 percent 
2. Convertible Notes 
There were twenty-two convertible note deals in the Study, fifteen of which were 
conducted through Wefunder and seven through StartEngine. There was less uniformity 
among the convertible note deals than the safe deals.  
                                                        
enforcement.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). Comment d to section 
205 explains that “evasion of the spirit of the bargain” is bad faith behavior that violates the duty. Id. 
 233. A few deals allowed early-bird investors to benefit from both the discount and the valuation cap.  
 234. Some of the issuers offered more favorable discount rates or valuation caps to early-bird investors. Table 





      05/15/2020   10:30:18
42208-tul_55-3 Sheet No. 87 Side A      05/15/2020   10:30:18
C M
Y K
ORCUTT J - FINAL FOR PUBLISHER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2020 9:49 AM 
2020] VALUING YOUNG STARTUPS IS UNAVOIDABLY DIFFICULT 527 
a. Conversions 
Like classic convertible notes, the convertible notes in the Study generally convert 
to preferred stock (or a shadow stock that resembles the issued securities but with 
modifications such as no voting rights) if the issuer (a) conducts a qualified equity 
financing (referred to as a “Qualified Financing” in the notes) or (b) experiences a change 
of control. However, two of the notes did not include Qualified Financing conversion 
provisions and only convert if a change of control occurs. 
Of the twenty notes with a Qualified Financing conversion provision, they generally 
defined a Qualified Financing as a transaction, or series of transactions, in which the issuer 
raises a stated cash threshold from a sale of the issuer’s capital stock. This means there are 
two key variables to define: (a) the size threshold; and (b) what qualifies as capital stock. 
One of the twenty notes did not include a size threshold. The other nineteen notes included 
size thresholds ranging from $250,000 to $7 million, with six of the notes including size 
thresholds above $1 million (see Table 11). Higher size thresholds make it easier for 
issuers to avoid conversion. 
Table 11 
Size thresholds for the convertible notes 
Size threshold to be a Qualified Financing Number of Issuers 
No size threshold 1
Up to $500,000 2
Above $500,000 and up to $1 million 11
Above $1 million and up to $2 million 3
Above $2 million and up to $3 million 2
Above $3 million 1
The convertible notes could define the issuer’s subsequent capital stock offering as 
including any equity securities (common or preferred), preferred stock only, or common 
stock only. If the option is limited, the issuer has the ability to avoid conversion by issuing 
a form of stock that does not trigger the Qualified Financing definition. Of the twenty notes 
with a Qualified Financing conversion provision, ten defined a Qualified Financing as 
including any equity securities. However, several of those notes went on to state the notes 
convert into the preferred stock issued in the triggering financing, creating ambiguity as to 
whether a Qualified Financing is actually limited solely to preferred stock.  
As with safes, conversion avoidance is problematic for convertible notes, but the 
problem is different. The main problem for convertible notes stems from what happens if 
the notes reach maturity without converting. Because the interest rate on a convertible note 
is typically low (see Table 12), issuers may wish to avoid conversion and simply pay off 
the loan when it matures. Considering that convertible notes are unsecured, low-interest 
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Table 12 
Interest rates for the convertible notes 








In the traditional startup market, issuers generally do not have an incentive to reach 
maturity without converting. These issuers want to cooperate with the venture capital 
community, raise a priced venture capital round, and reap the benefits of being a venture 
capital-backed company. If these issuers reach maturity without converting, it is because 
things have gone wrong. Just as safe issuers in the traditional startup market are unlikely 
to risk their reputation to avoid safe conversions, it is unlikely that note issuers in the 
traditional startup market would risk their reputation in the venture capital community to 
get a low interest loan. Moreover, convertible notes in the traditional setting often give 
note holders the option upon reaching maturity of (a) demanding immediate repayment or 
(b) converting the note into equity at a pre-set conversion rate that is likely to be beneficial 
to the note holders. If an issuer strategically sought to avoid conversion and repay the notes 
at maturity, the note holders could refuse payment and convert their notes to stock at the 
favorable pre-set rate. 
In the Regulation CF market, the incentives for issuers to avoid conversion and treat 
the convertible notes as low interest loans are less clear. First, reputation is unlikely to play 
the same enforcement role in the Regulation CF market. Most Regulation CF issuers are 
likely to be outsiders to the venture capital market, which is why they are raising 
Regulation CF capital in the first place, so they may be more willing to risk their reputation 
for a low interest loan. Second, most of the notes in the Study make it easy for issuers to 
treat the instruments as low interest loans. Six of the notes simply require the issuer to pay 
the principal and interest if the note reaches maturity.235 The other notes either 
automatically convert to stock at maturity or give note holders the option to convert. The 
conversion rate is typically based on the note’s valuation cap or discount rate. Because the 
valuation caps in the Study were generally high and the discount rates low (discussed 
                                                        
235. See ELEMENT FARMS, INC., OFFERING STATEMENT (FORM C) (Nov. 30, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1759704/000167025418000574/documents_list.htm; HOMEFREE,
LLC, OFFERING STATEMENT (FORM C/A) (Apr. 18, 2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1755119/000167025419000226/documents_list.htm; PHENOMIX 
SCIS. LLC, OFFERING STATEMENT (FORM C) (Nov. 9, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1757804/000167025418000530/documents_list.htm; SFO84, INC.
(MISTERB&B), OFFERING STATEMENT (FORM C/A) (Apr. 19, 2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1759313/000167025419000243/documents_list.htm; COOKIE DEP’T,
INC., OFFERING STATEMENT (FORM C/A) (Dec. 19, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1748804/000167025418000603/documents_list.htm; WISE POWER 
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below), the conversion option may provide note holders little solace.  
b. Prepayments 
As a general rule, convertible notes should prohibit issuers from prepaying the loan. 
It is the same issue as the conversion avoidance problem. If prepayments are allowed, 
issuers can strategically repay the notes before an attractive conversion event occurs. 
Rather than share the company’s free cash flows with more shareholders, the issuer can 
simply prepay the low interest loan. Five of the notes in the Study give issuers the right to 
prepay the notes at any time,236 while four of the notes give issuers the right to prepay the 
notes in advance of a change of control transaction.237 This author was very surprised to 
see broad prepayment rights in any of the notes, let alone forty percent of them!  
One of the notes prohibited prepayment and two of the notes were silent regarding 
prepayment, which probably means those issuers lack a prepayment right.238 The 
remaining ten notes only allow prepayment if the holders consent. 
c. Discounts and Valuation Caps 
Finally, the same concerns about low discounts and high valuation caps that applied 
to the Regulation CF safes apply equally to the convertible notes in the Study (see Table 
13). The convertible note discounts ranged from zero percent to twenty percent with an 
average discount of 15.2 percent, while valuation caps ranged from $1.9 million to $40 
million with an average valuation cap of $9.7 million.  
                                                        
236. See BOON, INC., OFFERING STATEMENT (FORM C) (June 3, 2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1774003/000167025419000368/documents_list.htm; HAWAIIAN OLA
BREWING CORP., OFFERING STATEMENT (FORM C) (Nov. 19, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1674519/000167025418000555/documents_list.htm; SFO84, INC.
(MISTERB&B), OFFERING STATEMENT (FORM C/A), supra note 235; SMARTGURLZ US INC, OFFERING 
STATEMENT (FORM C) (May 6, 2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1737125/000167025419000326/documents_list.htm; VERIGLIF INC.,
OFFERING STATEMENT (FORM C) (May 13, 2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1774921/000167025419000339/documents_list.htm.  
 237. DUN RITE GAMES, INC, OFFERING STATEMENT (FORM C) (Aug. 16, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1748769/000167025418000377/documents_list.htm; ELEMENT 
FARMS, INC., OFFERING STATEMENT (FORM C), supra note 235; HOMEFREE, LLC, OFFERING STATEMENT (FORM 
C/A), supra note 235; PHENOMIX SCIS. LLC, OFFERING STATEMENT (FORM C), supra note 235. 
 238. John N. Oest, Negotiating the Loan Commitment: The Borrower’s Perspective, ABA: BUS. L. TODAY
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Table 13 
Discounts and valuation caps for the convertible note issuers 
Discount Rates Number of 
Issuers
Valuation Caps Number 
of Issuers 
No discount rate 1 $30 million and above 2
5% 1 $20 million to below $30 million 0
7.5% 1 $10 million to below $20 million 5
10% 3 $5 million to below $10 million 9
15% 5 Below $5 million 6
17.5% 1
20% 10
Average discount was 15.2 percent Average valuation cap was $9.7 million 
C. Next Steps?  
What should be done about the Regulation CF deferred-equity market? As explained 
earlier, valuation deferral does not change investors’ ultimate goal of purchasing valuable 
future cash flows. It just changes the process for identifying and measuring the future cash 
flows, which ideally looks like this:  
A priced equity round triggers an automatic conversion; 
The deferred-equity investors’ future cash flows come from an exit event—
most likely a sale of the company—that takes place after the priced equity 
round; and 
High-quality investors in the priced equity round value the future cash flows 
from a projected exit event, with the deferred-equity investors taking that price 
(adjusted by a discount or valuation cap that compensates them for their 
additional risk). 
Valuation deferral works in the traditional startup market because the investors in 
the priced equity round tend to be venture capital firms that can thoughtfully value the 
future cash flows for the more-mature startup. Additionally, the classic deferred-equity 
instruments are generally pro-investor contracts that thoughtfully account for the risk that 
comes with these investments.  
The Study raises substantial concerns about the process for identifying/measuring 
future cash flows for deferred-equity instruments in the Regulation CF market. The issuers 
appear unlikely to ever raise capital from venture capital firms, which eliminates (a) the 
baseline conversion event and (b) the sophisticated investors who can be counted on to 
thoughtfully value the issuer’s future cash flows. That problem alone makes the Regulation 
CF deferred-equity market highly questionable. It lowers the probability of the instruments 
ever producing cash flows for investors. And if a conversion does occur, it lowers the 
probability of the subsequent investors accurately measuring the future cash flows. 
Assuming some thoughtful investors can get over this major problem, they should receive 
very investor-friendly instruments to account for this additional risk by providing investors 
with more upside potential and more downside protection. Despite the instruments’ 
abundant risk, the Study shows that Regulation CF issuers consistently obtain investment 
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exposure.  
To address the problem, this article recommends that the SEC or FINRA impose a 
suitability duty on funding portals that host Regulation CF deferred-equity offerings.239
This suitability duty could be similar to the one that brokers typically owe customers but 
adapted to the Regulation CF setting. The standard broker suitability duty is captured in 
FINRA240 Rule 2111.241 FINRA offers the following description: 
 FINRA Rule 2111 requires that a firm or associated person have a reasonable basis to 
believe a recommended transaction or investment strategy involving a security or securities 
is suitable for the customer. This is based on the information obtained through reasonable 
diligence of the firm or associated person to ascertain the customer’s investment profile. . . . 
. . . 
 Brokers must have a firm understanding of both the product and the customer, according 
to Rule 2111. The lack of such an understanding itself violates the suitability rule.242
 The duty is intended to prevent broker’s from pushing inappropriate investments on 
vulnerable investors. The broker must (a) know the customer (“customer-specific 
suitability”) and (b) know the investment so the broker can have a reasonable basis for 
believing it is suitable for that customer (the “reasonable basis” obligation).243 Both tasks 
require the broker use reasonable diligence. For example, it would be unsuitable for a 
broker to recommend a speculative investment with a substantial risk of principal erosion 
to an eighty-five-year-old widow(er) with limited funds for retirement. It would also be 
unsuitable for a broker to recommend to anyone investments that are designed to fail.244
The suitability duty would require some adaption for funding portals. Funding 
portals are a new form of securities intermediary introduced by the JOBS Act and 
Regulation CF to facilitate Regulation CF transactions. Regulation CF transactions must 
be conducted through either a broker or a funding portal.245 Republic,246 StartEngine, and 
                                                        
 239. In their 2016 essay, Green and Coyle considered the idea of a suitability duty for funding portals when 
offering safes. Green & Coyle (2016), supra note 13, at 180–81 n.36. 
 240. FINRA is not a governmental organization. It is a national securities association that is registered with 
the SEC per Exchange Act section 15A. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3. However, brokers fall under the jurisdiction of 
FINRA because Exchange Act section 15(b)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8), mandates that registered brokers become 
members of FINRA, subject to limited exemptions set forth in Exchange Act Rule 15b9-1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b9-
1. 
 241. Rule 2111, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules/2111 (last visited Feb. 
22, 2020). 
 242. Suitability, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/industry/suitability (last visited Feb. 22, 2020). 
 243. FINRA describes the suitability duty as having three components: (a) reasonable basis suitability; (b) 
customer-specific suitability; and (3) quantitative suitability. Id. “Quantitative suitability requires a broker with 
actual or de facto control over a customer’s account to have a reasonable basis for believing that a series of 
recommended transactions, even if suitable when viewed in isolation, is not excessive and unsuitable for the 
customer when taken together in light of the customer’s investment profile.” Id.
 244. Rule 2111, supra note 241, at Supplementary Material .05(a).
 245. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(C). Brokers are the standard intermediary for securities transactions. Exchange Act 
section 3(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4), defines a broker as any person (including legal entities), other than a bank, 
that is “engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others.” Brokers are 
heavily regulated entities that must register with the SEC, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1), and become members of 
FINRA, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8). Due to concerns about brokers’ heavy regulatory burden, funding portals were 
introduced as an additional securities intermediary. Funding portals may not engage in all the activities a broker 
may engage in, but they are also less-heavily regulated. 
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Wefunder are all funding portals.247
FINRA’s Rule 2111 does not apply to funding portals. It only applies to brokers and 
dealers.248 Despite performing some broker-like functions, funding portals are not 
brokers. Moreover, Exchange Act section 3(a)(80)249 and Regulation CF Rule 402(a)250
prohibit funding portals from offering investment advice or recommendations, which are 
the triggers for the Rule 2111 suitability duty. While prohibited from advising or 
recommending, Regulation CF Rule 402(b) contains a safe harbor permitting funding 
portals to engage in certain similar activities.251 Most importantly for this article’s 
recommendation, Rule 402(b)(1) allows funding portals to “[d]etermine whether and 
under what terms to allow an issuer to offer and sell securities in reliance on section 4(a)(6) 
of the Securities Act . . . through its platform . . . .”252 The SEC could expand Rule 402(b) 
to make pre-clearing deferred-equity issuers mandatory, rather than permissible. FINRA 
could then impose a suitability duty on funding portals253 relating to this mandatory 
preclearance obligation. Like brokers, funding portals are FINRA members and subject to 
its rule-making authority. 
FINRA has experience tailoring suitability obligations to specific investment types, 
so this should not be a burdensome task for FINRA. FINRA Rule 2111 sets forth the 
general suitability duty. However, for certain more complex instruments, such as direct 
participation programs, options, and futures, FINRA has developed additional suitability 
requirements that brokers must satisfy.254 For Regulation CF deferred-equity instruments, 
this author suggests the suitability duty focus primarily on the reasonable basis obligation, 
rather than the customer-specific suitability component. The problem is not that funding 
portals are hosting high-risk investments that some of its customers may not understand. 
The problem is that many of the Regulation CF deferred-equity instruments are poorly 
designed and offer no investor, regardless of sophistication, much chance for success. 
The instruments are designed to generate positive results from a subsequent 
equity financing led by sophisticated investors who can properly value the 
issuer. The entire valuation deferral mechanism depends on that subsequent 
equity financing priced by sophisticated investors. Yet, most of the issuers 
                                                        
 247. Funding Portals We Regulate, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/about/funding-portals-we-regulate (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2020). The FINRA list includes OpenDeal Portal LLC (which operates under the name 
“Republic”), StartEngine Capital LLC, and Wefunder Portal LLC. 
 248. Dealers are defined in Exchange Act section 3(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5), generally as any person, other 
than a bank, who is in the business of buying and selling securities for her own account as part of a regular 
business. 
 249. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(80). Due to a typographical error, there are two Exchange Act sections 3(a)(80). One 
defines “emerging growth companies” and one defines “funding portals.”
 250. 17 C.F.R. § 227.402(a). 
 251. 17 C.F.R. § 227.402(b). 
 252. 17 C.F.R. § 227.402(b)(1). 
 253. If brokers established Regulation CF platforms, the same duty would apply to them. 
254. See, e.g., Rule 2310(b)(2), FINRA, 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=8469 (last visited Feb. 22, 
2020) (establishing additional suitability standards for direct participation programs); Rule 2360(b)(19), FINRA, 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=6306 (last visited Feb. 22, 
2020) (establishing additional suitability standards for options); Rule 2370(b)(19), FINRA, 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=6309 (last visited Feb. 22, 
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appear unlikely to ever accomplish such an offering.  
Most of the instruments allow issuers an unacceptably broad ability to avoid 
conversion, which can be exploited by issuers. 
Some of the convertible notes are essentially high-risk, low-reward 
instruments. They are low-reward instruments due to conversion avoidance 
features and/or prepayment rights that may limit their reward to that of a low-
interest, unsecured loan, but with far more risk. 
To allow issuers to sell deferred-equity instruments through their platforms, funding 
portals would need to have a reasonable basis to believe, based on reasonable diligence, 
that such instruments are suitable for at least some investors. Reasonable diligence would 
need to provide the funding portals with an understanding of the potential risks and 
rewards of the instruments.255 It is not clear that all of the current batch of Regulation CF 
deferred-equity instruments would pass that standard.  
A suitability duty would also help to correct a conflict of interest that currently 
plagues the Regulation CF market. Because issuers are the ones paying the funding portals, 
the portals’ first loyalty is likely to their issuers. It should come as no surprise that Republic 
and Wefunder, whose businesses depend substantially on deferred-equity issuers,256 have 
developed very issuer-friendly deferred-equity instruments that they actively market to 
issuers and investors. In addition to forcing funding portals to eliminate the worst-designed 
instruments, a suitability duty would reduce the conflict of interest by requiring funding 
portals to give due consideration to investors’ interests before allowing deferred-equity 
instruments to sell through their platforms.  
V. CONCLUSION
In a well-functioning market, reasonable investors are less likely to invest in 
companies when they cannot confidently value the opportunity, which reduces vital 
fundraising for young startups. Deferred-equity instruments offer a partial solution by 
allowing Specialized Startup Investors to thoughtfully invest in venture capital-eligible 
young startups without valuing them at the time of investment. They provide a contractual 
solution to an otherwise intractable problem. Rather than directly value the expected cash 
flows that come from investing in a young startup, deferred-equity instruments allow a 
future equity financing—that is priced by highly sophisticated investors, such as venture 
                                                        
 255. This suggestion is based on Supplemental Material .05(a) to Rule 2111, which explains: 
The reasonable-basis obligation requires a member or associated person to have a reasonable 
basis to believe, based on reasonable diligence, that the recommendation is suitable for at 
least some investors. In general, what constitutes reasonable diligence will vary depending on, 
among other things, the complexity of and risks associated with the security or investment 
strategy and the member’s or associated person’s familiarity with the security or investment 
strategy. A member’s or associated person’s reasonable diligence must provide the member or 
associated person with an understanding of the potential risks and rewards associated with the 
recommended security or strategy. The lack of such an understanding when recommending a 
security or strategy violates the suitability rule. 
Rule 2111, supra note 241, at Supplementary Material .05(a).
 256. During the Study’s time period: 
Thirty-six of the forty deals (or ninety percent) funded through Republic were safes. 
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capital firms—value the cash flows. The deferred-equity investors then take the price set 
by the sophisticated investors (adjusted for any discount or valuation cap). The investment 
decision for deferred-equity investors is thus changed from projecting the young startup’s 
future profits/cash flows and accounting for their uncertainty (which are unavoidably 
difficult tasks when the young startup has no meaningful operating history) to predicting 
whether the startup will conduct a future, high-quality stock offering (which should be 
manageable for Specialized Startup Investors). Deferred-equity instruments have become 
an important financing tool for the traditional startup market and have positively 
contributed to the United States’ seed financing explosion over the last decade.
If the story ended there, deferred-equity instruments would be a resounding success. 
However, their spread to the Regulation CF market does not appear to be positive. This 
article’s examination of the deferred-equity deals funded through the Republic, 
StartEngine, and Wefunder portals during 2019 paints a picture of improper risk transfers 
to unsophisticated public investors. To address the problem, this article recommends that 
the SEC or FINRA impose a suitability duty on funding portals that host Regulation CF 
deferred-equity offerings. It is important to note that crowdfunding remains a relatively 
new phenomenon. Regulation CF issuers and offerings may look very different in a few 
years. For example, Regulation CF issuers could develop a more integrated relationship 
with the venture capital community. This article’s strong criticism of the current 
Regulation CF deferred-equity market could look outdated in a few years. An advantage 
of the proposed suitability solution is its adaptability. If future Regulation CF offerings 
involve issuers with meaningful opportunities to raise venture capital and more investor-
friendly terms, a suitability duty would not be an obstacle. 
Finally, this article closes with a message to policymakers outside the United States. 
Finding seed funding solutions for young startups is a critical matter for policymakers 
around the world, not just the United States. The lessons from this article apply to any 
country with a meaningful startup market. Deferred-equity instruments are an important 
financing tool when used by Specialized Startup Investors to invest in young startups that 
are eligible for future equity financings involving highly sophisticated investors. However, 
they are also a dangerous tool when used by young startups to raise capital from the general 
public. Deferred equity’s positive role in a traditional startup market should not lead to 
lenient regulation in a crowdfunding setting. And their negative role in a crowdfunding 
setting should not lead to greater regulation in a traditional startup market. 
